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Work Domain Analysis (WDA) and task analysis are methods that can be used to 
develop complex systems that support human operators.  Task analysis can be used to 
describe the nominal tasks of many complex safety critical systems which are also highly 
proceduralized. However, complex systems may require human operators to have a 
greater understanding of the system’s dynamics than can be obtained from procedures 
derived from a task analysis. This is particularly true when off-nominal events occur, for 
which there is no procedure. By concentrating on the constraints in the work domain 
instead of tasks, work domain analysis can complement task analysis by supporting 
operators during off-nominal events that do not have any predescribed procedures. 
The goal of this study was to use WDA and two forms of task analysis to derive 
interface and procedure modifications for a new aviation concept called interval 
management. Interval management is a new concept whose goal is to increase runway 
throughput by enabling aircraft to achieve a precise interval behind a lead aircraft. This 
study used data from a human-in-the-loop study conducted at NASA Langley Research 
Center to develop a Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), Control Task Analysis (CTA), 
and WDA. The HTA was used to describe a nominal set or procedures, the CTA was 
used to describe strategies pilots could use to make decisions regarding the IM operation, 
and the WDA was used to determine representations and procedures that could convey 
complete and accurate knowledge of interval management to the flightcrew.
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1.   CHAPTER 1 
    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Task analysis and Work Domain Analysis (WDA) are methods that have been 
used in the design of complex systems [1], [2]. Each of these methods is built on 
different, yet complementary, philosophies. Task analysis assumes that there is a 
predictable series of tasks, or actions, which must be completed to control a system. By 
understanding these tasks, interfaces and procedures can be designed to support their 
completion. Furthermore, task analysis can be used to identify tasks that are error prone 
and to build appropriate redundancies into the system. Often times, task analysis is 
thought of as a normative approach to designing a system, since task analysis often 
involves developing a particular scenario and pre-determining tasks needed to achieve the 
desired outcome. However, effective human performance in off-nominal conditions often 
requires deeper knowledge of the system than task analysis can provide. WDA is one 
method that has shown the ability to help designers provide this knowledge to the 
operator. WDA is built on the philosophy that a work domain has a number of operating 
constraints and a set of dynamics that describe how it will respond to a given input. The 
constraints and dynamics can be imposed by the laws of nature, rules and regulations, or 
logic programmed into automation. Outside the nominal operating conditions, the human 
operator may be required to use their knowledge of the operation’s dynamics to restore 
the normal operating conditions. Since the WDA concentrates on providing the operator 
with a deep understanding of the work domain, it has been suggested that the knowledge 
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conveyed by the WDA can be used to support the operator when unanticipated 
circumstances are encountered for which there is no prescribed procedure. 
Thus, previous research has suggested that task analysis and WDA are 
complementary methods that can be used together to design effective support for off-
nominal conditions while also providing interfaces and procedures that support effective 
task completion [3]. Since WDA does not examine specific tasks, it does not assume any 
particular activities by the human operator. Instead, interfaces designed using WDA seek 
to convey an external mental model of the constraints and dynamics present in the 
system. In contrast, task analysis focuses on the nominal actions the operator is expected 
to perform, as well as the information and controls needed to complete those actions. 
Thus, a task analysis can help design procedures and interfaces for nominal events, and a 
WDA can result in interfaces that provide information that support effective responses 
when unanticipated events occur. For the purpose of this thesis, nominal events will be 
considered all of the normal and abnormal events that were anticipated during the design 
process. Off-nominal events will be considered unforeseen events or chains of events that 
the designers did not consider. Using task analysis and WDA together has the potential to 
result in displays and procedures that support the operator during both nominal operating 
conditions and convey a better understanding of the system which can be used to detect 
off-nominal events and plan an appropriate course of action if an unanticipated event 
occurs.  
Interval Management (IM) is a concept that is currently being developed by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), as well as other organizations, to help aircraft achieve precise 
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spacing intervals at the runway threshold. IM can be defined as delegating the 
responsibility of achieving and/or maintain a spacing interval behind one or more lead 
aircraft from Air Traffic Control (ATC) to the flightdeck [4]. Within the IM concept, Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) remains responsible for separation between aircraft, but the 
flightdeck is given the responsibility of maintaining a spacing interval. The IM system 
that is being developed at the NASA Langley Research Center contains two separate 
pieces: Flightdeck Interval Management (FIM) and Ground Interval Management (GIM). 
Previous studies have shown the ability of IM to increase the precision of arrivals, 
enabling fuel efficient descents during periods of high throughput. However, until 
recently, most of these studies have either concentrated on FIM or GIM instead of an 
integrated system. The ground portion and flightdeck portion are currently being 
integrated together and tested in preparation for a near-term flight demonstration [5].  
The joint use of task analysis and WDA has the potential to help guide the 
development of flightdeck displays and procedures to increase the usability of the IM 
operation and help convey a deep understanding of IM to the flightcrew. The objective of 
this thesis is to use data from a recent Human-In-the-Loop (HITL) experiment along with 
two forms of task analysis and a WDA to evaluate the procedures and interfaces that are 
being proposed for IM. The HITL experiment is used to develop a Hierarchical Task 
Analysis (HTA), Control Task Analysis (CTA), and WDA. The HTA was used to 
describe a nominal set or procedures, the CTA was used to describe strategies pilots 
could use to make decisions regarding the IM operation, and the WDA was used to 
determine representations and procedures that could convey complete and accurate 
knowledge of interval management to the flightcrew. The HTA, CTA, and WDA are then 
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used to describe interfaces and procedures that have the potential to increase pilots’ 
understanding and the usability of IM. A secondary goal of this thesis is to demonstrate 
the joint use of HTA, CTA and WDA in aviation. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter two will review 
HTA, CTA, and WDA, how they have been used in the aviation domain, and the 
previous research that has examined their joint use. Furthermore, chapter two will review 
previous HITL experiments that have studied IM. Chapter three describes a HITL 
experiment that analyzed an implementation of IM that supports arrivals to dependent 
parallel runways. The information obtained from this experiment is used to help build the 
HTA, CTA, and WDA models that are described in chapter four. These models 
concentrate on describing the constraints and dynamics of the IM system, as well as the 
nominal course of action pilots are expected to follow. Chapter five uses the results from 
the HITL study and information from the models to describe procedural and interface 
improvements that have the potential to provide pilots with an accurate mental model of 
IM. Chapter six, the final chapter, will provide an overview of the key points and 
conclusions of this thesis. 
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2.   CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.  
2.1. Task Analysis 
2.1.1. What is a Task Analysis 
Task analysis is the study of observable tasks or mental processes that need to be 
completed to achieve a system goal. A task is an action that is completed to operate a 
system. When designing a new system, or when analyzing existing systems, it is useful to 
examine the information and controls that are required for an operator to carry out a 
particular task and confirm that the operator has access to them. Additionally, it is 
important to ensure the tasks effectively move the system toward its intended objective. 
Several methods of completing task analysis have been proposed including: flow charts, 
network graphs, link analysis, Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), and timeline analysis, 
among others [6].  
Of the task analysis methods, HTA was chosen for this study because of its ability 
to map tasks to higher level goals, its scalability, and its history of use. Research has 
shown that HTA can be used to provide guidance when designing training programs, 
workspace layout, equipment design, allocation of functions, and procedure design  [7], 
[8]. Additionally, HTA can be used as an input for a large variety of human factors 
methods including human error identification, human risk analysis, and mental workload 
assessment, among others [8]. Furthermore, a significant portion of the work on 
combining task analysis and Work Domain Analysis (WDA) has focused on the 
combination of HTA and WDA [9–11].  
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2.1.2. Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
HTA was developed in the 1960s as a means of producing training requirements 
[12]. Since then, HTA has expanded its original role and demonstrated usefulness in 
aiding the design of interfaces, procedures, and teams [2]. HTA is built on the philosophy 
that there are a number of tasks human operators complete to move a system toward its 
intended goal. These tasks can be analyzed by decomposing the high level tasks needed 
to achieve the system goal into subtasks. Thus, HTA is a variant of task analysis that 
organizes the task structure according to their contribution to system goals [7]. Each of 
the tasks may require an event to trigger them, information to support task completion, 
and access to controls that enable the operator to complete the task. 
An HTA contains a hierarchy of tasks that stem from a system goal. From this 
goal, tasks are allocated and given subtasks. These subtasks can be decomposed into 
further subtasks until it is determined that further decomposition will not provide 
additional benefit. Figure 2.1 shows a simple task analysis with the system goal of 
operating a toaster. This goal is broken into subtasks, such as “insert bread,” which are 
required to accomplish the system goal. A plan describes the order of task completion, 
and the conditions that trigger the need to complete a given tasks. If necessary, these 
tasks can be decomposed into subtasks, such as “plug in toaster” and “ensure power to 
toaster is switched on.” A lower level plan describes how the subtasks should be 
completed. Thus, HTA represents subtasks needed to achieve a system goal, with a plan 
indicating when each of the subtasks should be completed. The process of expanding 
subtasks continues until the developer determines that further expansion will not provide 
adequate benefit. Shepherd describes the iterative process of completing an HTA as [2]: 
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1. Identify the main goal to be analyzed 
2. Explore the operating constraints 
3. Judge whether a goal will be met sufficiently 
4. If the goal is met sufficiently, stop analysis; otherwise, continue expanding tasks 
5. Examine the operation in terms of human-task interaction and form hypotheses 
6. Estimate the cost-benefit of exploring the hypotheses 
7. Redescribe the goal 
0. Operate toaster
 






5. Adjust toaster 
setting
 
1. Ensure power to 
toaster
 




Plan 0: 1-2-3. When the toast pops up – 4. If 
the toast is satisfactory – EXIT. If the toast is 
unsatisfactory (too light or too dark) – 5, 
then repeat from 2
Plan 1: 1-2
1.2. Ensure power 
to toaster is 
switched on
 
Figure 2.1: Example of a hierarchical task analysis, adopted from [2] 
 
 
Once the HTA is completed, it can be used to define interface requirements and 
procedures [2]. Each task requires some method of activation and feedback to notify the 
operator that the task is completed successfully. Thus, system requirements can be 
defined by requiring either a display element or a procedural step to notify the operator 
that a task must be completed. Furthermore, the tasks can be analyzed to ensure that 
urgent tasks have salient activators and common tasks are streamlined. The designer can 
also look for task patterns that are similar to those used by other systems the operator is 
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familiar with, and attempt to match them.   
HTA excels at describing the tasks the operator must complete to achieve the 
system goal, as well as the information requirements needed to complete the tasks. 
However, HTA is limited to task sequences that are predicted within the design process, 
which can result in designs that are unable to support the operator during unanticipated 
events. This presents a particular challenge in aviation, where many accidents occur 
because of a complex sequence of events and actions that were not anticipated by 
designers. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that humans use three basic modes of 
behavior: skill based behavior, rule based behavior, and knowledge based behavior [13]. 
Skill based behavior can be thought of as automatic operations that are well practiced, 
rule based behavior as following a set of either internal or external rules (i.e. rules stored 
in memory or in a procedures/interface), and knowledge based behavior as problem 
solving. Task based interfaces often support skill based behavior and rule based behavior, 
but have problems supporting knowledge based behavior, which can result in the inability 
to develop an appropriate course of action when anticipated events occur or can result in 
an incomplete or incorrect understanding of a complex automated system. Additionally, 
the course of behavior mapped out by task analysis may not be optimal, effective, or 
efficient for every situation. Instead, it analyzes the tasks operators should perform from 
a limited set of predefined scenarios. 
2.1.3. The Use of Task Analysis in Aviation 
Task analysis has a significant history of use in the aviation industry, and has 
been used to examine many different aviation systems. For example, Keller, Leiden, and 
Small completed a cognitive task analysis of commercial jet pilots during instrument 
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approaches with the purpose of aiding the design of synthetic vision displays [14]. 
Additionally, task analysis has been used to examine procedures for aircraft maintenance 
[15], [16]. Sperling used a task analysis along with a WDA to help identify 
complementary sets of information to provide to the commander and co-pilot of military 
helicopters [9]. Perhaps the most applicable task analysis to this thesis is one completed 
by RTCA to help identify minimum flightdeck requirements for IM [4].  
2.2. Work Domain Analysis 
2.2.1. Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) 
Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) was proposed by Vicente and Rasmussen as a 
five step method that can be used to design systems that support the operator during both 
anticipated and unanticipated events [1], [17]. CWA can be broken into five major steps: 
work domain analysis (WDA); Control Task Analysis (CTA); strategies analysis; social, 
organization, and cooperation analysis; and a worker competency analysis. These steps 
are shown in Table 2.1; note that the steps of CWA proposed by Vicente and Rasmussen 
were slightly different from each other, with the largest difference being that Rasmussen 
proposed that CTA should have two parts: activity analysis and decision analysis. The 
first step of CWA, WDA, describes the entire work domain of the system. The second 
step of CWA, CTA, describes the tasks the operator can do to control the system and the 
decision making process the operator uses when completing the control task. The third 
step of CWA is a strategies analysis, which describes how to complete control tasks. This 
step is the most similar to task analysis. The fourth step of CWA is social, organization, 
and cooperation analysis, which examines how functions can be split between operators 
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and goals. The final step of CWA is a worker competency analysis, which identifies the 
interface requirements and training an operator will need to function in the work domain. 
Table 2.1: The parts of Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) 
Vicente (1999),  [1] Rasmussen (1994), [17] Description 
- Work Domain 
Analysis (WDA) 
- Work Domain 
Analysis (WDA) 
Describes the work domain 
in terms of the systems 
purpose, constraints, and 
relationships 
- Control Task 
Analysis (CTA) 
- Activity analysis in 
domain terms 
- Decision analysis in 
information terms 
Describes control tasks that 
can be used to operate the 
system 
- Strategies Analysis 
- Information 
processing strategies 
Describes the different 
strategies that can be used 
to complete a control task 
- Social Organization 
and Cooperation 
Analysis 




Examines how functions 
and goals can be split 





- Mental resources, 
competency, and 
preferences of the 
individual actor 
Describes what workers 




A search of the literature found only a few instances where use of the entire CWA 
process has been documented. Ahlstrom conducted a CWA to assess practices of 
controlling air traffic during adverse weather conditions [18], and Sanderson, Naikar, 
Lintern, and Goss conducted a CWA for a military system called Airborne Early Warning 
and Control [19], [20]. There are several potential reasons why the entire CWA process is 
not used more frequently. Completing a CWA can be time consuming and requires 
extensive knowledge of the system and constraints imposed on the system. There has not 
been extensive research on the cost benefit of completing a CWA in comparison to other 
methods of system design. Furthermore, a search of the literature did not find a clear, 
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consistent standard methodology for the latter steps of the CWA process, and the benefit 
of using these latter steps to investigate IM was unclear. Thus, only the WDA and CTA 
portions of CWA are used in this thesis.  
A WDA describes the entire work domain of the system, and the constraints that 
govern the system. One common method of representing the work domain is the 
Abstraction-Decomposition Space (ADS), otherwise known as the Abstraction Hierarchy 
(AH) [1], [22]. The ADS has five different levels of abstraction along its vertical 
dimension: the first level describes the purpose of the system (abstract purpose), the 
second level describes the basic laws of nature that govern the system (abstract function), 
the third level describes the functions the system must achieve (generalized function), the 
fourth level describes the major components that are used to achieve the generalized 
functions (physical function), and the final layer describes the physical components, such 
as specific interfaces and buttons (physical form). The vertical axis of the ADS can be 
thought of as using the high levels of abstraction to describe why a system is being 
developed, the middle levels of abstraction to describe what the system will do, and the 
lower levels of abstraction to describe how the system will meet its goals. Functions 
within the levels of abstraction are connected by means-end relationships. The horizontal 
dimension of the ADS decomposes the system into smaller and smaller subcomponents. 
The result is a table where each block contains a complete description of the system 
constraints in different levels of generality. Naikar, Hopcroft, and Moylan described a 
procedure for using the ADS, which includes the following steps [23]: 
1. Establish the purpose of WDA 
2. Identify the project constraints 
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3. Determine the boundaries of WDA 
4. Identify the nature of constraints 
5. Identify the potential sources of information 
6. Construct ADS 
7. Validate ADS 
Additionally, Naikar, Hopcroft, and Moylan further detail that the sixth step, construction 
of the ADS, should be completed by identifying the work-domain properties, defining the 
levels of abstraction and decomposition, developing a sketch of ADS, evaluating which 
cells of the ADS to populate, populating the selected cells, and then revisiting the original 
data to make sure that the ADS is representative [23].  








     
Abstract  
Function 
     
Generalized 
Function 
     
Physical  
Function 
     
Physical 
Form 
     
 
 
Control Task Analysis (CTA), the second part of CWA, is used to describe tasks 
that control the system. The decision ladder, which was developed by Rasmussen in 
1976, is commonly used to represent the decision making process that operators use when 
conducting control tasks [24], [25]. The decision ladder is composed of an idealized 
rational decision making process, which includes data processing blocks (represented by 







(represented by circles in Figure 2.2). The idealized decision making process is bent in 
half, creating the decision ladder. The left side of the decision ladder describes how the 
operator can gather knowledge of the system and the right side describes how the 
operator can determine a plan of action. Expert operators may be able to use knowledge 
of the system to skip certain steps in the decision ladder. These jumps can be categorized 
as shunts or leaps, and are represented by dashed lines in Figure 2.2. Shunts connect data 
processing blocks to states of knowledge, and are intended to describe instances where 
data processing allows the operator to skip steps on the decision ladder. For instance, 
information from displays may tell an operator what the target state of the system should 
be. Leaps connect two states of knowledge together, and are intended to show pieces of 
information that are connected. For instance, a user may observe information from a 
display, and automatically associate it with a procedure.  
The decision ladder can also be used to describe skill, rule, and knowledge based 
behaviors. Skill based behavior can be thought of as well trained automatic processes that 
require little thought. The bottom portion of the decision ladder represents skill based 
behavior as observing data and executing a predetermined plan. Rule based behavior can 
be thought of as a series of IF, THEN statements. The rule based portion of the decision 
ladder includes steps where the operator describes the system state, and determines tasks 
that can be used to achieve a given goal. Knowledge based behavior is used when there 
are no skills or rules that apply to a given situation, and can be thought of as learning and 
experimenting to develop an appropriate course of action. The entire decision ladder 
describes knowledge based behavior, with the top portion focused on an iterative process 
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of determining a system goal, predicting the consequences of attempting to achieve that 
goal, and determining a new goal when the existing goal is not adequate. 
CTA is commonly used along with the WDA [1]; however, it can also be a useful 
way of describing control tasks presented in an HTA. In the HTA example presented in 
Figure 2.1, many of the tasks were descriptive. However, control tasks can be added. The 
decision ladder can be used to determine if the user has adequate information and 
controls to perform the control task. In this way, the HTA can be viewed as a complete 
description of nominal behavior that the operators can complete, and use to identify 
different control tasks. In contrast, the WDA is used to describe the breadth of decisions 
the operator can make. The decision ladder can be linked to both the HTA and WDA. If 
there is an appropriate procedure described in the HTA, the operator can leap to the 
procedure and execute it. If there is not an appropriate procedure in the HTA, the 
operator must evaluate options and formulate a course of action. This involves using 
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Figure 2.2: The decision ladder, developed by Rasmussen, provides a framework that can be used to 
describe how humans operators complete control tasks (adapted from [24], [25]) 
 
 
When developing interfaces using a WDA, designers often use Ecological 
Interface Design (EID) principles [26]. The philosophy behind EID is to use interface 
elements to transfer an accurate mental model of a system to the operator. This is 
accomplished by displaying the operating constraints and dynamics of a system in an 
integrated and natural way, using appropriate representations. By creating interfaces that 
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serve as an external mental model of the system EID seeks to support skill, rule, and 
knowledge based behavior [13], as well as skill and rule based behavior that can often be 
supported using a task based approach. When designing EID interfaces it is common to 
use the ADS to describe the system and then transfer the constraints from the ADS into 
display elements. 
EID displays seek to integrate a large amount of complex information into 
intuitive representations of the system, allowing the operator to gain an accurate mental 
model of the system. Zhang and Norman described distributed representations [27], and 
later applied it to flightdeck displays [28]. The idea of distributed representations states 
that each system has both internal and external representations. Internal representations 
refer to those that the operator must memorize. External representations refer to 
representations that can be inferred from displays or the environment. The internal and 
external representations can be combined to form a mental model of how a particular 
system works.  
While WDA has demonstrated its ability to inform the designs of complex 
systems, the aviation domain creates unique challenges that WDA does not consider. The 
aviation industry is heavily proceduralized, and many non-normal circumstances have 
been anticipated and addressed. Furthermore, the WDA does not contain information 
regarding time critical tasks or the operator’s taskload. Lastly, there are limited resources 
for monitoring information aboard a flightdeck. WDA and EID often entail presenting the 
operator with a large amount of information, albeit in an integrated and easy to 
understand manner. Nevertheless, commercial aviation is complex, and there is potential 
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that providing too much information, without regard to taskload, may decrease the 
benefits of an EID interface.  
2.2.2. The Use of Work Domain Analysis in Aviation 
Accidents that occur in aviation are often the result of a string of events which 
were not anticipated in design. WDA has the potential to assist in the design of avionics 
and ATC automation that support pilots and air traffic controllers during these unforeseen 
events. A number of researchers have used WDA to help design novel flight concepts, 
interfaces, and teams.  
WDA has been used to examine concepts and displays in support of free flight 
concepts and collision avoidance. Van Dam, Mulder, and Paassen used WDA to develop 
an interface for a tactical airborne separation tool that would grant pilots greater freedom 
to choose their own trajectories [29]. They used the WDA to determine workspace 
constraints, which were translated into display elements that showed pilots the 
trajectories they could fly while maintaining proper separation from other aircraft. Ho 
and Burns used a WDA to design interfaces for collision detection and avoidance 
automation [30]. They created a WDA that encompassed the aircraft, environment, and 
collision avoidance system, and found a number of pieces of information that may help 
pilots choose the correct action when presented with a conflict. Borst used EID to design 
interfaces for a terrain awareness warning system [31]. The goal of this research was to 
help pilots deduce why a particular warning was given. Their findings indicated that 
providing pilots with an EID display helped increase their understanding of terrain 
warnings. Furthermore, placing information about the operational envelope on the 
displays caused the pilots to ‘push the envelope’ more; however, the displays helped 
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prevent the pilot from pushing the envelope over the limit. Lastly, Amelink, Paassen, 
Mulder, and Flach used a WDA to gain more insight into what factors are involved with 
aircraft energy management [32]. 
In addition to free flight concepts and collision avoidance, WDA has been used to 
help pilots monitor their aircraft’s engine performance, manage their aircraft’s energy, 
and help ATC monitor weather. Ahlstrom used all of the steps of CWA to examine 
weather displays for air traffic controllers, helping them discover beneficial information 
that was missing from ATC weather displays [18]. Dinadis and Vicente used a WDA to 
create a prototype interface for the fuel and engines of a Lockheed Hercules C-130 [33]. 
They used an ADS to model each part of the fuel and engine interface, and found that the 
then-current interface portrayed the higher and lower levels of abstraction; however, the 
middle levels of abstraction in the ADS were only partially portrayed. Furthermore, they 
found that the EID operating philosophy was significantly different from the aviation 
operating philosophy of the time. The aviation operating philosophy placed a low 
emphasis on deep knowledge of the system, and instead emphasized following procedural 
steps to achieve mission success. Dinadis and Vicente cited several reasons why the 
aviation industry used this philosophy. Most notably, knowledge based behavior may 
take more time than pilots have available during a crisis, and managing aircraft systems is 
secondary to flying the aircraft (i.e. the pilots can just turn the automation off). However, 
they conclude by describing reasons why WDA and EID are pertinent to aviation. Most 
notably, procedures are unable to capture all possible events, especially as air traffic 
increases.  
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Research has also shown that WDA can be useful when designing teams and 
training requirements. Naikar and Sanderson used WDA to develop an effective training 
program for the F/A-18 [34]. They used WDA to decompose the system into functions, 
which were then used to develop a comprehensive training program. Sperling used both 
HTA and WDA to determine complementary information to show team members, and 
found that the performance of teams increased when they were each provided with 
complementary information that was relevant to their tasks instead of all team members 
being presented with all available information [9]. 
2.3. The Joint Use of Task Analysis and Work Domain Analysis 
Miller and Vicente (1998) were among the first researchers to suggest that task 
analysis and WDA could be used together to develop interfaces that support specific 
tasks the operators were required to complete, while providing the operator with the 
information needed to make critical decisions during unanticipated circumstances [35]. 
They determined that the information provided by task analysis and WDA was 
complementary. Specifically, they found that task analyses were good at describing 
proceduralized information and time pertinent information, whereas WDA contained 
deep knowledge of a system that could be used to help operators gain an accurate mental 
model of the system. By adding task based information to EID displays, they were able to 
add strategy guides, expectation indicators, sequencing information, information 
prioritization, and dynamic organization, among other information to their interface 
design. 
Sperling examined the joint use of HTA and WDA with the goal of designing 
interfaces that support complementary mental models among team members [9]. He 
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conducted two HITL experiments with similar work domains and task domains: a 
helicopter navigation task, and an automobile navigation task. A WDA and HTA were 
used to show that the helicopter simulation and automobile simulation had similar work 
domains and task domains, and to determine complementary sets of information to 
display to the participants. The experiment results demonstrated that providing a team of 
operators with complementary information can increase team performance and help 
clarify team roles. 
Researchers have described different approaches regarding how to combine task 
analysis and WDA into a unified model. Miller and Vicente took the approach of 
generating requirements from a task analysis and WDA, combining those requirements, 
and using them to generate a display [36]. Sperling mapped information sources onto 
supporting tasks (i.e. tasks that used those information sources) [9]. Hajdukiewicz and 
Vicente developed and demonstrated a model where each task was described by a 
relevant segment of the ADS [10]. The ADS was narrowed from the entire ADS that 
described the whole work domain, to a small portion of the ADS that included the current 





Figure 2.3: A joint task analysis and work domain analysis model developed by Hajdukiewicz 
and Vicente [10]  
 
 
In two separate experiments, Jamieson (2002) and Burns (2008) examined the 
real-world benefit of using a joint task analysis and WDA method to design interfaces. 
Jamieson (2002) conducted a HITL study examining the use of a legacy interface, a 
traditional EID display, and an EID display with task information [37]. In a separate 
experiment, Burns et al. investigated interfaces for nuclear process control [38]. In both 
cases, the EID interfaces resulted in increased performance during unanticipated events. 
Furthermore, the addition of task information to EID interfaces resulted in increased 
performance during anticipated non-normal events. 
WDA was only meant to be the first step in a multi-step processes that includes 
CTA, strategies analysis, social organizational and cooperation analysis, and worker 
competencies analysis [1]. However, most of the work that has been completed on the 
joint use of task analysis and WDA has not discussed the impact of the other steps in 
CWA. One exception is the work done by Salmon [11]. Salmon compared the theory, 
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methodology, and contribution to system design of HTA and CWA. The comparison 
suggested that CWA and HTA were complementary: HTA may be more useful when 
designing improvements to an existing system or when analyzing a highly proceduralized 
system, and CWA may be more useful when analyzing very complex systems or when 
designing a system that is the first of its kind. However, many complex systems are also 
highly proceduralized. Thus, there is the potential for complex proceduralized systems to 
benefit from both task analysis and WDA. 
Overall, the literature has shown that the joint use of task analysis and WDA can 
provide a number of benefits. Task analysis is good at identifying priority information, 
supporting the design of procedures, and describing a nominal set of actions the operator 
should complete. WDA is good at providing deep knowledge of the constraints and 
dynamics of a system. These advantages have the potential to make the joint use of WDA 
and task analysis useful to aviation. The commercial aviation industry is heavily 
proceduralized during nominal conditions and contains many time critical tasks, such as 
preventing separation violations, or reacting to a TCAS advisory. Task analysis can help 
provide insight into these issues. However, the procedures can be either incomplete or 
incorrect when off-nominal circumstances are encountered, requiring operators to 
intervene and problem solve. This requires a thorough understanding of the constraints 
and dynamics of the automation. WDA has the ability to help develop interfaces that can 
convey deep knowledge of the system. Thus, developing displays and procedures using a 
task analysis and a WDA has the potential to result in interfaces, procedures, and training 
programs that help pilots complete tasks, while providing them with knowledge needed 
to respond to unanticipated events. 
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2.4. Interval Management 
The joint use of HTA and WDA can be applied to Interval Management (IM), 
which is an aviation operational concept that is currently being developed by various 
organizations around the world. The goal of IM is to enable aircraft to achieve precise 
spacing intervals behind a lead aircraft at a particular geographical location. This section 
will provide background information on IM and a review of major Human-In-The-Loop 
(HITL) experiments that have been conducted. 
2.4.1. Background 
 By 2030, the number of passengers, cargo aircraft, and commercial aircraft are 
expected to increase by over 50% (from 2009 numbers) [39]. If current day operations 
are maintained, the increased traffic will result in greater noise pollution, air pollution, 
delays, and the need for new infrastructures. The desire to minimize the impact of these 
effects has motivated the development of various systems, which have been collectively 
named the NextGen air system [40]. Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs), also known as 
Continuous Descent Arrivals (CDAs), are near idle thrust descents that have the potential 
to decrease aircraft noise, fuel usage, and air pollution. However, OPDs can cause a 
higher level of uncertainty in the aircraft arrival time at the runway because they limit the 
extent to which aircraft can slow down or be vectored by ATC. Larger spacing buffers 
are needed to ensure that aircraft on OPD arrivals will not produce a separation violation, 
limiting the use of OPDs to periods of low traffic. One proposed method of minimizing 
this uncertainty, and consequently maximizing runway throughput, is to delegate spacing 
and separation responsibilities from Air Traffic Control (ATC) to the flightcrew. In 2001 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Eurocontrol defined four levels of 
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delegation of responsibility [41]. 
 Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness: Airborne traffic situational awareness 
tools improve the flight crew’s situation awareness. ATC remains responsible for the 
spacing and separation of all aircraft. 
 Airborne Spacing: The flightcrew is responsible for maintaining spacing from an 
aircraft delegated by ATC. ATC is still responsible for maintaining separation from 
all aircraft. 
 Airborne Separation: Responsibility for separation from a lead aircraft that is 
properly equipped can be delegated to the flightcrew by ATC. The flightcrew will 
have the responsibility to maintain all separation requirements from the delegated 
aircraft, whereas ATC will remain responsible for separation from all non-delegated 
aircraft. 
 Airborne Self-separation: Airborne self-separation delegates the responsibility of 
maintaining separation from all surrounding aircraft to the flightcrew. ATC is no 
longer responsible for separation. 
 
The airborne spacing concept includes delegating the responsibility of 
maintaining a spacing interval to the flight crew, with ATC remaining responsible for 
separation between all aircraft [41]. Many different implementations of airborne spacing 
have been studied; however, the focus of this study is on an implementation of IM that 
has been developed at NASA Langley Research Center. This particular implementation 
uses the a trajectory based approach where an arrival time is projected along a 4-D 
trajectory for both the spacing aircraft and its lead aircraft, as opposed to a state-based 
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approach which uses the lead aircraft’s state to control the spacing interval. The major 
advantage of a trajectory based approach is that it allows an aircraft to achieve a spacing 
interval behind a lead aircraft that is on a different trajectory. This allows an aircraft to 
begin the spacing operation earlier than it could without knowledge of the lead aircraft’s 
trajectory. The IM operation that this thesis investigates includes two parts: a ground 
scheduling tool that creates an arrival schedule for aircraft, and flightdeck automation 
which provides the speeds that the flightcrew can fly to achieve a desired spacing interval 
at a designated achieve-by point. 
Particular attention has been given to the airborne spacing concept during arrivals 
to busy terminal areas, with a focus on achieving the maximum precision possible during 
normal and anticipated non-normal conditions. HITL experiments have demonstrated the 
benefits of both the ground scheduling tool and the flightdeck tool during arrivals to busy 
terminal areas. A HITL experiment conducted by MITRE revealed that current day 
operations result in a mean spacing interval at the runway threshold of 24.8 seconds, with 
a standard deviation of 17.0 seconds. In contrast, the largest mean spacing error at the 
runway threshold for multiple airborne spacing scenarios was 2.2 seconds with a standard 
deviation of 1.3 seconds [42], [43]. Baxley et al. reported that precise runway delivery 
can reduce ATC’s spacing buffer by 10 to 15 seconds, resulting in a 5% to 10% increase 
in runway throughput [44]. While these gains may seem small, Credeur’s (1997) analysis 
of terminal operations showed that a 5% increase in runway throughput can result in a 
29% decrease in delays for an airport running at 85% capacity [45].  
A number of HITL experiments have examined the flightdeck and ground 
portions of IM. Some of the major investigators have been Eurocontrol, MITRE, NASA 
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Langley, and NASA Ames. Additionally, an industry standards group, RTCA, has 
recommended a set of minimum standards for Flightdeck Interval Management (FIM) 
[4]. Many of the HITL studies conducted by each of these organizations will be discussed 
in the next section. In addition to the HITL studies, various batch studies have been 
conducted, and different spacing algorithms considered. These are considered outside of 
the scope of this thesis, and will not be discussed. 
2.4.2. Airborne Spacing Experiments 
Eurocontrol completed a set of experiments assessing an airborne spacing concept 
under their CoSpace project. Their first experiment examined the acceptability and 
effectiveness of three spacing instructions: remain, merge, and heading then merge [46]. 
Overall, the pilot participants rated their workload as acceptable; however, they requested 
either a speed advisory when manually entering speeds or an auto-throttle mode to 
manage the speed. Additionally, the flight crew requested an indicator to describe how 
well they were maintaining the spacing interval. In a subsequent experiment, Eurocontrol 
examined the effect of 1NM, 0.5NM, and 0.25NM spacing intervals on flightcrew 
acceptability, speed of action, spacing accuracy, and safety [47], [48]. The results of this 
experiment indicated that the number of speed actions increased from 1 to 1.7 speed 
actions per minute as the spacing interval was decreased with the 0.25NM spacing 
interval causing higher workload for the Pilot Flying (PF). Even with the addition of the 
trend indicator, pilot comments indicated that they preferred an auto-throttle mode to 
manage the speed. As the final experiment of the CoSpace project, Eurocontrol examined 
airborne spacing with Continuous Decent Arrivals (CDAs), as well as speed and lateral 
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modes managed by the autopilot [49]. Pilot participants gave high acceptability ratings 
throughout the experiment.   
In addition to conducting airborne spacing studies of the flightdeck, Eurocontrol 
examined the usability and acceptability of their airborne spacing concept from ATC’s 
perspective. Eurocontrol investigated the usability of airborne spacing during periods of 
high traffic [50]. They found that air traffic controllers experienced a reduction in 
workload and increased predictability of spacing on final approach, as well as less 
vectoring late in the arrival. In another study, Eurocontrol investigated the usability of 
airborne spacing procedures under medium-high traffic [51]. Controller feedback 
indicated that the airborne spacing procedures were usable. Furthermore, controller 
responses indicated they preferred using time based spacing intervals as opposed to 
distance based spacing intervals. Lastly, controllers were reluctant to cancel the airborne 
spacing operation. Eurocontrol investigated a number of non-normal conditions, 
including a go-around, an emergency aircraft that had to be integrated into the flow, a 
radio failure, and spacing instructions that were not correctly executed [52]. They 
concluded each of the conditions tested were the same difficulty as today’s operations. 
Lastly, Eurocontrol conducted an experiment investigating the joint use of an aircraft 
sequencing tool and the airborne spacing instructions [53]. They conducted separate 
evaluations for the en-route airspace and the terminal area. They found that heading and 
speed instructions reduced in terminal area, and that the scheduler helped controllers 
ensure the capacity of terminal airspace was not exceeded. 
MITRE conducted four HITL experiments examining an airborne spacing concept 
called Flight Deck Merging and Spacing (FDMS). These experiments were designed to 
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examine the FDMS concept that was being developed by the FAA, and that the United 
Parcel Service (UPS) desired to implement. The first of these experiments, FDMS 1, 
evaluated the air traffic efficiency, communications, safety, workload, and situational 
awareness from ATC’s perspective [54]. The results of the experiment demonstrated that 
the FDMS operations resulted in about half of the interventions that were present in the 
baseline scenario while providing favorable ratings of workload and situational 
awareness. MITRE’s second HITL study, FDMS 2, examined the flight crew’s 
acceptance of FDMS procedures during nominal and off-nominal operations [42]. In 
general, the pilot participants found the FDMS procedures and a majority of the display 
elements acceptable, with the exception of the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
(CDTI) displayed on an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). Pilots stated that the location of the 
EFB made it difficult to work the CDTI into their scan patterns. MITRE’s third HITL 
study, FDMS 3, evaluated flight crew’s acceptance of FDMS procedures coupled with 
CDAs under both nominal and off-nominal conditions [55]. The experiment results 
demonstrated large improvements in aircraft delivery precision, and pilot participants 
found the overall concept acceptable. However, there were areas for improvement, such 
as the number and frequency of speed changes. MITRE’s fourth HITL study, FDMS 4, 
examined FDMS with CDAs from ATC’s perspective [56]. The results demonstrated that 
controllers found the FDMS procedures acceptable, and that controller interventions to a 
single arrival stream of aircraft were lessened.  
NASA has a long history of researching airborne spacing. NASA Langley was 
one of the primary investigators of interval management in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s [57], [58]. Within these studies, pilots were required to use a CDTI to monitor the 
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progress of the spacing operation and determine specific actions needed to conform to a 
given spacing interval [57], [59]. The results found that cluttered displays and a long 
refresh rate of four seconds contributed to increased dwell time on the CDTI. Since these 
early experiments, there have been technological advances including precise position 
information and the ability for aircraft to transfer information to each other. These 
advances, in conjunction with the push for the NextGen air system, spawned new 
research of airborne spacing. 
Around 2002, NASA Langley renewed its interest in airborne spacing. In 2002, 
Oseguera-Lohr completed a HITL study examining NASA’s Advanced Terminal Area 
Approach Spacing (ATAAS) concept [60]. The experiment examined a baseline of 
today’s operations and three spacing modes: manual control, speed intervene, and an 
autopilot managed mode.  The results of the experiment demonstrated that the ATAAS 
procedures and workload were acceptable. The head down time and number of speed 
changes increased from the baseline scenario, but still received favorable ratings. In 
2005, a HITL study was conducted to examine a new airborne spacing concept, Airborne 
Merging and Spacing for Terminal Arrivals (AMSTAR) [61]. AMSTAR was built on the 
previous spacing algorithm called Airborne Precision Spacing (APS), and contained an 
onboard algorithm that used 4-D trajectories to calculate a commanded speed that could 
be flown to achieve the desired spacing interval. Overall, pilots provided acceptable 
ratings of AMSTAR; however, pilot’s found some deficiencies. It was suggested that 
these deficiencies were the results of poor training and the use of medium fidelity 
simulators.  
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After this experiment, the airborne spacing concept was renamed from AMSTAR 
to IM. Murdoch describes a HITL study in 2009 that examined the flightdeck 
implementation of IM coupled with CDAs during nominal and off nominal conditions 
[62]. The objectives of the experiment were to determine pilot acceptability of the IM 
concept and procedures, and to characterize system performance. They found that the IM 
procedures were acceptable, and only resulted in a small increase in workload. The pilot 
participants indicated that the procedures were adequate for the events in the experiment, 
but a significant number of pilots indicated that the procedures were incomplete. Another 
HITL experiment conducted at NASA Langley examined IM during dependent parallel 
arrivals into a busy terminal area [63]. Overall the participants found the IM concept, 
workload, procedures, interface, and commanded speeds acceptable. Nevertheless, there 
were changes to the procedures and interface that were recommended, including more 
salient alerting of commanded speed changes and the ability of a single crewmember to 
set up the IM operation. In preparation for the HITL experiment investigating IM to 
dependent parallel runways, Volk conducted a suability analysis of the IM displays. 
During the study, he showed pilots’ video recordings of aircraft displays with various IM 
displays added, and gathered pilots’ responses [64]. He found that pilots provided highest 
ratings to displays that contained graphical spacing trend indicators, though it was 
unclear how pilots used the information from the trend indicators. 
Other organizations have also conducted research on airborne spacing concepts. 
Pritchett and Yankosky examined airborne spacing using three different displays that 
were presented on the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI), and three different 
procedures [65]. The three displays included a baseline display without speed 
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information, a display showing the speed of the lead aircraft, and a display showing the 
speed target and the current speed of the lead aircraft. The three sets of procedures were 
represented as a baseline STAR without speed information, a STAR that told the 
flightcrew what speeds to expect at a particular point in the arrival, and a STAR with 
both speeds and the merging path. They determined that there was interaction between 
the CDTI displays and procedures, and that the information contained in the procedures 
was useful as long as the lead aircraft followed their procedure. They conclude by 
suggesting that a robust system may need greater emphasis on displays as opposed to 
procedures or further controller oversight. In DO-328, RTCA conducted the only known 
task analysis of IM and used it to recommend minimum display requirements needed to 
complete the operation [4]. This thesis will build on the task analysis RTCA conducted, 
with the goal of describing procedures and interfaces that will best support the operator, 
as opposed to focusing on minimum requirements. 
In addition to flightdeck automation, the IM concept requires ATC to have the 
ability to schedule aircraft. NASA Ames has been investigating ATC automation that has 
the ability to create precise runway schedules, and is expected to serve as the ground 
portion of IM. The ground scheduling system is built on the Traffic Management Advisor 
(TMA), which was developed at NASA AMES research center in the 1990s, and is 
currently in use at some Air Traffic Control Centers [66], [67]. TMA is a strategic tool 
that can provide air traffic controllers with the ability to optimize the traffic flow at high 
demand airports by using trajectory prediction, constraint-based runway scheduling, and 
traffic flow visualization. The ground portion of IM is based on Traffic Management 
Advisor with Terminal Metering (TMA-TM). Figure 2.4 shows a number of display  
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Figure 2.4: Moving clockwise from bottom left to right [68], a) Flight data block how early or late the 
aircraft is, b) Flight data block showing an advised speed, and c) TMA timeline with ETAs on the left 
and STAs on the right 
 
elements that TMA-TM can use [68]. Figure 2.4 (a) shows the slot marker (circle) which 
is designed to show the location TMA expects the aircraft to be, and the time error of the 
aircraft in the bottom row of the data block. Figure 2.4 (b) shows the same slot marker 
(circle), with a data block containing an advised speed that controllers can convey to the 
aircraft keep them on schedule. Figure 2.4 (c) shows a time line that contains the TMA 
schedule. The left side shows the Estimated Times of Arrival (ETA), and the right side 








between leading and trailing aircraft, which can also be used to identify gaps in the 
schedule. Overall, it is envisioned that there will be three pieces to a new airborne 
spacing system: TMA-TM will compute an aircraft schedule and Estimated Time Of 
Arrivals (ETAs); Controller Managed Spacing will use the time schedule generated by 
TMA, and provides speed advisories to air traffic controllers, which they can relay to 
aircraft that are not equipped for airborne spacing; and FIM equipped aircraft, which will 
use onboard speed guidance to achieve a precise interval at a designated point. 
A number of experiments examined TMA used with ground based spacing. This 
discussion will concentrate on the most recent work with The Terminal Area Precision 
Scheduling and Spacing (TAPSS) system built on TMA. A HITL study compared the 
TAPSS system with today’s operations at traffic levels similar to today’s air traffic, and 
increases of 5%, 10%, and 20% from today’s traffic levels [69]. The experiment 
demonstrated that the TAPSS system was capable of achieving a 10% increase in runway 
throughput from today’s operations when the airport was busy. TAPSS has also 
demonstrated benefits such as a decrease in level segments, flight distance savings, flight 
time savings, and a greater ability for aircraft to maintain fuel efficient CDAs [70]. 
Another HITL experiment was conducted to examine how air traffic controllers used 
three different displays when wind errors and other disturbances are present [71]. The 
three display conditions included a timeline, slot marker, and advisory tool. The study 
determined that controllers thought the timeline was very useful, and preferred the 
displays that contained the slot markers (circles). Currently, HITL experiments are 
examining these ATC operations integrated with IM in the flightdeck. 
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The experiments described in this section reveal extensive research into IM. This 
research has shown that IM is capable of substantially increasing the arrival precision of 
aircraft, and that air traffic controllers and pilots generally find the IM operation 
acceptable. Nevertheless, many of the HITL experiments suggest improvements that 
could be made to the IM operation. Currently, work is being conducted on integrating the 
flightdeck and ground components of IM. As this integration occurs, and as IM moves 
closer to implementation, it is important to examine procedures and interfaces that have 
the potential to support pilots and air traffic controllers when conducting IM operations. 
2.5. Summary 
Task analysis and WDA are two methods that have been successfully used to 
design procedures and user interfaces. Task analysis examines the actions an operator is 
required to complete, ensuring that operators are provided with appropriate information 
and controls needed to complete a given task. However, task analysis does not provide 
the operator with guidance on how to complete tasks that the designers of the system did 
not anticipate. Furthermore, displays designed using a task analysis may not convey a 
complete mental model of the work domain. This can be problematic when an operator is 
required to devise an appropriate course of action when unanticipated events occur. 
WDA is a complementary approach that analyzes the domain in terms of different levels 
of abstraction and decompositions, creating a map of the domain’s functions and 
constraints. EID can be used to develop representations of these functions and constraints 
which support skill, rule, and knowledge based behavior during off-nominal 
circumstances. 
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Research has shown that task analysis and WDA are complementary methods that 
can be used together to help design systems that support operators during both anticipated 
and unanticipated situations. Task analysis is a method that can help designers increase 
the usability of a system by ensuring tasks are supported with appropriate displays, 
procedures, and training. WDA provides deep knowledge about the domain and its 
constraints.  
IM is a new concept that is being developed with the goal of increasing the arrival 
precision, enabling the use of OPDs during periods of high traffic and increasing runway 
throughput. Multiple experiments examined the ground based portion of IM and the 
flightdeck portion. These experiments have concentrated on anticipated (nominal) events, 
and have demonstrated the ability of IM to increase the precision of arrivals. Moreover, 
these experiments have discovered improvements that can be made to the IM system. 
RTCA has written a document that recommends a set of minimum performance 
requirements, display requirements, and procedure requirements. This thesis will build on 
this previous work and seek to define an optimal set of displays and procedures that will 
support pilots and air traffic controllers during both nominal and off-nominal operations.  
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3.   CHAPTER 3 
IM HUMAN-IN-THE-LOOP EXPERIMENT 
3.  
3.1. Introduction 
A Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) experiment, called the Interval Management with 
Spacing to Parallel Dependent Runways (IMSPiDR) experiment, was conducted at 
NASA Langley to investigate Interval Management (IM) to dependent parallel runways 
using the Airborne Spacing for Terminal Area Routes (ASTAR) spacing algorithm [63], 
[72]. The IMSPiDR experiment examined the flightdeck implementation of IM during 
arrivals to dependent parallel runways using two control methods and three sources of 
error. Since this experiment was only designed to evaluate the flightdeck portion of IM, a 
runway scheduler was not used. Instead the scenarios were scripted, and the arrival flow 
was carefully conditioned to avoid any conflicts. The results from this experiment will be 
fed into the joint Work Domain Analysis (WDA) and Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
analysis in the next chapter.  
The purpose of the IMSPiDR experiment was to evaluate IM with dependent 
parallel runways when significant disturbances were present. The goal was to determine 
the acceptability of the IM operation and evaluate the spacing algorithm’s performance 
when aircraft were controlled by human pilots. The acceptability of the IM operation can 
be broken into four categories: acceptability of the IM concept, the spacing algorithm’s 
behavior, the IM procedures, and the IM interfaces. Data on the interfaces and 
procedures, as well as the pilots understanding of IM, are of particular interest to this 
thesis. 
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This chapter will include a description of the IMSPiDR experiment, and an 
analysis of a subset of its results. The data that will be examined will include measures of 
workload and pilot acceptance, procedural and operational issues, pilot ratings of IM 
displays, and the time it took for pilots to accomplish time critical tasks. The data and 
conclusions from this chapter will be used to create a WDA and HTA model that will be 
presented in chapter 4, and will ultimately help determine modifications to the procedures 
and displays that will be discussed in chapter 5. 
3.2. Experiment Method 
3.2.1. Experiment Procedure and Scenario Design 
Scenario Design 
The objective of the IMSPiDR HITL experiment was to investigate IM and 
Required time of Arrivals (RTAs) to dependent parallel runways when significant 
spacing perturbations were present. Each scenario included a number of simulated 
aircraft and six human piloted aircraft flying arrivals into Dallas Ft. Worth, from a point 
just prior to the Top of Descent (TOD) to the runway threshold. Pilots were asked to 
follow speed commands generated by onboard avionics to achieve a spacing interval 
designated by Air Traffic Control (ATC).  
This experiment’s goal was to investigate IM to dependent parallel runways. 
When arriving to dependent parallel runways there are two separation requirements that 
must be considered; a wake vortex separation requirement from the aircraft arriving to 
the same runway as the spacing aircraft, and a diagonal separation requirement for an 
aircraft arriving to the parallel runway (see Figure 3.1). The spacing algorithm used in 
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this experiment had the capability of spacing off of two lead aircraft. The aircraft that 




Figure 3.1: IM to dependent parallel runways 
 
The scenarios were designed to simulate a near term NextGen environment, 
where a high runway throughput rate was required. All of the arrivals in this experiment 
were fuel efficient Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs). To add to the realism, Standard 
Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs) were modified for the OPD arrivals and provided to 
pilots. Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) messages were used for all 
IM and RTA clearances; however, voice commands were used to provide pilots with 
frequency changes and other clearances. Additionally, radio chatter was simulated to 
provide pilots with a more immersive environment. 
Experiment Procedure 
Three groups of eight pilots participated in the experiment. Each group was 
present for a four day period. During this time, they trained, conducted eleven data 
collection runs, filled out an extensive post-experiment questionnaire, and participated in 
a group debrief after the experiment had concluded. The eight pilots from each group 
were assigned one of three different simulator types: two different high fidelity two-crew 
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simulators, and four copies of the same type of single crew PC simulator. Throughout the 
experiment each pilot rotated between a series of different routes and the scenarios were 
ordered randomly to prevent order effects due to learning and fatigue. 
Comprehensive classroom sessions as well as three training scenarios were 
provided to participants to help them learn the IM procedures and acclimate to the 
simulators. Two major classroom sessions were conducted prior to data analysis. The first 
session concentrated on the controls and displays present in each simulator, and was 
followed by two training runs that were intended to allow the participants to acclimate to 
the simulators. The second session concentrated on the IM displays and procedures, and 
was followed by two training runs that allowed the participants to acclimate to the 
IM/RTA operations. An additional IM training run was conducted at the beginning of the 
second day as a refresher course. 
Both qualitative and quantitative data was collected during this experiment. The 
quantitative data included aircraft state data and data from the spacing algorithm, 
describing its performance. The qualitative data included three questionnaires, as well as 
a verbal debrief. A pre-experiment questionnaire was provided to the participants prior to 
the experiment to collect biographical data and any preconceptions of IM they had. After 
each run, a post-run questionnaire was provided to the participants to gather workload 
ratings, acceptability ratings, and any participants’ comments pertaining to the particular 
run. After all of the data collection runs were complete, the participants were given an 
extensive post-experiment questionnaire. The post-experiment questionnaire was 
intended to collect information about the usefulness and usability of the IM displays and 
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procedures. Lastly, a group debrief session was conducted to allow the participants to 
verbally relay their thoughts on the IM operation, procedures, and interface. 
The dependent measures that were of interest in this experiment ranged from 
algorithm performance data to crew acceptability ratings; the ratings and comments 
related to the procedures and interfaces are of particular interest to this thesis. The 
Modified Cooper-Harper workload scale was used to collect both an average and peak 
workload from participants after each run, and pilots were asked to provide the segment 
of flight where their peak workload occurred. In addition to workload ratings, qualitative 
data on the acceptability of speed commands were gathered after each run. Quantitative 
data on the performance of the algorithm were also collected during each run. The 
quantitative data of interest includes the time error at the runway threshold (a measure of 
throughput), the number of speed changes (a measure of taskload), and the time it took 
pilots to respond to their IM clearances and react to new speed changes.  Lastly, 
qualitative ratings on the displays and procedures were collected from the post-
experiment questionnaire. 
Participants 
There were 24 pilots that participated in this study. All of the pilots were 
experienced commercial airline pilots that were employed by major U.S. air carriers. The 
pilot’s ages ranged from 37-61 years old, and they had an average of 20 years of 
experience and 11,000 hours of airline flight time. In general, pilots were matched with 
simulators that were similar to aircraft they had experience on to reduce the amount of 
training needed; and of the 12 pilots assigned to the two-crew flight simulators, 5 of the 6 
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pairs were selected from the same airline to enable them to use consistent airline 
procedures for intra-crew coordination. 
 
3.2.2. Pilot Tasks 
All of the human piloted aircraft in the nominal scenarios began their flight at a 
point just prior to the TOD and flew to the runway threshold. Shortly after the simulation 
began an IM/RTA CPDLC clearance was provided to the flightcrews, who were expected 
to review the clearance, determine that it was acceptable, and begin the IM operation. If 
the pilots were conducting an RTA scenario, they were expected to follow the speed 
commands provided by the RTA algorithm to the runway threshold. If the pilots were 
conducting an IM scenario, they were expected to follow speed commands generated by 
the RTA control method until they were within Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) range of their lead aircraft. At this point the aircraft would switch 
from the RTA control method to the IM control method, and pilots would follow IM 
speed commands to achieve a precise spacing interval at the Final Approach Fix (FAF). 
Pilot Procedures 
The procedures that the pilots were asked to use can be broken into three parts: 
activating IM, conducting IM, and terminating IM. The procedures were designed to be 
simple and easy to follow.  The procedures in this experiment assumed that the IM or 
RTA clearance would be provided by a CPDLC message, and that the flightcrew would 
cancel the spacing operation if there were any problems. 
Activating the IM operation required receiving a clearance from Air Traffic 
Control (ATC), reviewing the clearance, activating ASTAR to calculate an initial 
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commanded speed, and executing the operation if the flightcrew deemed the clearance 
and ASTAR commanded speed was acceptable. The activation was completed differently 
in the single crew simulators and two-crew simulators. In the single crew simulators, 
pilots used the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) display to load and 
review the CPDLC clearance; and the Multi-Function Cockpit Display Unit (MCDU) to 
activate ASTAR, view the initial commanded speed, and execute the IM operation if the 
speed was acceptable. Pilots in the two-crew simulators used the MCDU to load, review, 
and respond to the CPDLC clearance; and the other MCDU to activate ASTAR, view the 
initial commanded speed, and execute the IM operation if the speed was acceptable. This 
was similar to how CPDLC message are currently done in oceanic operations, and 
required extensive coordination between the Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Not Flying 
(PNF). 
When the flightcrews were conducting the operation, they were required to carry 
out their normal flight duties while monitoring the Primary Flight Display (PFD) for 
speed changes and monitoring for any ASTAR memos, advisories, or cautions. IM speed 
changes were indicated in three ways: a change in the commanded end speed value, a 
green box that appeared around the commanded end speed for ten seconds (consistent 
with aircraft mode changes), and the speed bug would begin moving from the old 
commanded end speed toward the new commanded end speed. When a commanded 
speed change occurs, the flightcrews were required to update it. Pilots in the Integration 
Flight Deck (IFD) simulator were expected to update the Mode Control Panel (MCP) 
speed window to match the commanded speed all the time. The Flight Management 
System (FMS) in the single crew Personal Computer (PC) simulators and Development 
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Test Simulator (DTS) would automatically command the auto throttles to match a new 
commanded speed. However, the speed window would open when the aircraft had 
captured the Instrument Landing System (ILS), forcing the pilots to manually match the 
commanded speed using the MCP speed window. In addition to watching for changes to 
the commanded speed, pilots were required to monitor for ASTAR errors. These errors 
were displayed on the EICAS display. An additional task pilots had in the IM scenarios 
was to notify ATC when they transitioned from the RTA control method to the IM 
control method. In this experiment, this transition occurred when the spacing aircraft was 
within ADS-B range of its lead aircraft. The pilots in the ATOL could arm a report that 
would automatically be sent to ATC, and the pilots in the IFD and DTS were required to 
make a radio call to ATC. 
The final portion of the procedures described how, and when, the IM operation 
could be terminated. There are four general reasons why the flightcrew could terminate 
the spacing operation: if they no longer thought the spacing operation was acceptable, if 
there was an ASTAR error that required termination, or if the time error moved outside 
the ‘excessive spacing’ bounds. In addition, ATC could terminate the operation to 
prevent a separation violation or provide any other needed commands. In the nominal 
scenarios, the flightcrew was notified of any ASTAR errors and breaching of the 
excessive error bounds by and EICAS message. In the exploratory scenario, the 
flightcrew could also use the conformance box on the Navigation Display (ND) to 
monitor the excessive error bounds. 
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3.2.3. Facilities 
This experiment was conducted at NASA Langley Research Center using three 
separate types of simulator platforms: the Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL), the 
Development Test Simulator (DTS), and the Integration Flight Deck (IFD). Each of the 
simulators used the same 6 Degrees Of Freedom (DOF) aerodynamics model; however, 
the displays came from the flightdecks of different aircraft. The facilities were linked 
together, allowing the simulators to run together in real time. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Clockwise from the top left: (a) Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL), (b) 
Development Test Simulator (DTS), (c) Integration Flight Deck (IFD) 
 
The ATOL is comprised of a number of medium fidelity PC simulators that run 
on the Airspace and Traffic Operations Simulation (ATOS) platform [73]. The ATOL is 
comprised of hundreds of PC simulators that can be used for batch simulation. Twenty of 
the ATOS simulators are set up to be operated by a human. These simulators include a 
mouse controlled interface, a 6-DOF kinematic and aerodynamic model, a modeled FMS, 
and an ADS-B model. 
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The DTS is a high fidelity simulator of a large transport aircraft (Figure 3.2, b). 
The DTS uses a high fidelity 6-DOF aerodynamics model, and is equipped with eight D-
Sized LCD displays, sidestick controls, rudder pedals, two color MCDUs, and additional 
interface devices derived from a variety of commercial aircraft. 
The IFD is a full scale simulator of a large transportation aircraft, and is the 
highest fidelity simulator used in the experiment (Figure 3.2, c). The IFD contains actual 
aircraft hardware, a high fidelity 6-DOF aerodynamics model, and a 200° horizontal by 
40° vertical field-of-view out the window. The IFD has the ability to be placed on a 
motion platform; however, motion was not used in this experiment. 
Flightdeck Automation 
The Airborne Spacing for Terminal Area Routes (ASTAR) algorithm was 
designed to provide the flightcrew with speed advisories to enable them to precisely meet 
their assigned spacing interval [74–76]. ASTAR10, the latest version of ASTAR, added 
the capability to support dependent parallel runway operations. ASTAR uses knowledge 
of the spacing aircraft’s and lead aircraft’s 4D-trajectories to compute a Time-To-Go 
(TTG) to an achieve by point for each aircraft. ASTAR’s speed control law uses the 
knowledge of the spacing aircraft’s TTG and the lead aircraft’s TTG to compute a 
commanded speed that the spacing aircraft can fly to achieve the designated spacing 
interval at the achieve by point. The main advantage of using a trajectory based approach 
is that it permits aircraft that are on separate routes to space off each other, enabling the 
spacing operation to begin earlier in the arrival.  
Within this experiment, the ASTAR speed control algorithm contained a number 
of filters and constraints designed to reduce the number of speed changes while 
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maintaining arrival precision. ASTAR has three mechanisms that that are intended to 
decrease the number of speed changes. The first mechanism is a gain schedule that made 
commanded speed changes more sensitive to a given time error as the aircraft approached 
the runway. The second mechanism is a notch filter that subtracted the filter value from 
the time error. For example, if the raw (unfiltered) time error was twenty seconds, and the 
filter value was fifteen seconds, the time error used to generate the commanded speeds 
would be five seconds. The third mechanism is a function that looked ten seconds ahead 
for a profile speed decrease, and inhibited speed increases during that ten second period. 
ASTAR also has mechanisms that keep it from generating unacceptable 
commanded speeds, and features that help it align with regulations. To keep the 
commanded speeds within an acceptable range, ASTAR limits it commanded speed 
deviations to +/- 10% of the nominal profile speed. To keep the speeds consistent with 
regulations, ASTAR has the capability of complying with the 250 knot speed restriction 
below an altitude of 10,000ft. Additionally, if the achieve by point is the runway 
threshold, ASTAR will stop providing speed commands around the Final Approach Fix 
(FAF) to allow the flightcrew to concentrate on achieving a stabilized approach and 
landing the aircraft. 
The Pilot Interface 
Interfaces were added to the PFD, the ND, the MCDU, and the EICAS displays. 
Each of the displays varied slightly between different simulator types; however, the 
philosophy of the display design remained the same. Each display has similar indicators 
of the ASTAR commanded speeds, visualization of the lead aircraft, visualization of the 




Figure 3.3. Display elements added to the PFD (left) and the ND (right) in support of the spacing 
operation. 
 
The displays that were added to PFD to support the IM operation are shown in 
Figure 3.3. The commanded end speed was a green number shown above the speed tape 
that indicated the ASTAR commanded speed chunked in five knot increments. The 
commanded end speed was located just above the FMS commanded speed in the ASTOR 
simulators and DTS (the IFD did not have a number for the FMS commanded speed 
above the speed tape), allowing the flightcrew to easily determine if the IM commanded 
end speed and the FMS commanded speed matched. If it did not, the flightcrew was 
required to dial the IM commanded end speed into the MCP speed window. The 
instantaneous commanded speed bug was placed on the speed tape, and moved smoothly 
between a previous commanded end speed and a new commanded end speed, allowing 
the flightcrew to accelerate or decelerate their aircraft at the rate ASTAR predicted. 
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Additionally, the speed bugs implemented in the ASTOR simulators and DTS were +/- 5 
knots wide, matching the five knot conformance limit that pilots were asked to achieve 
(The IFD’s speed bug was different due to a different FMS speed bug style). When a 
speed change occurred, a green box would appear around the commanded end speed for 
ten seconds and the speed bug would begin moving toward the new commanded end 
speed. Lastly, ASTAR modes were displays next to the commanded end speed. The 
ASTAR modes included RTA, IM, Rvt (If there were any errors), and fnl (after the aircraft 
passed the final approach fix). When the ASTAR mode changed, a green box appeared 
around the ASTAR mode indicator for a period of ten seconds. This was consistent with 
the annunciation of the aircraft autopilot mode changes. 
The indications added to the ND portrayed both lead aircraft, the differential 
altitude between the spacing aircraft and the lead aircraft, and the lead aircraft’s callsign. 
The two lead aircraft were indicated by double chevrons (or double diamonds in the IFD 
and DTS). To indicate which lead aircraft was controlling the spacing operation at a 
given time, the outermost chevron of the aircraft that was controlling the commanded 
speed was turned green. Additionally, the data tags of the lead aircraft were modified to 
include their callsign and the difference in altitude between the spacing aircraft and the 
lead aircraft. Lastly, a trend indicator called the “conformance box” was added to the 
display during the exploratory run. The conformance box was a green box that appeared 
around the depiction of the spacing aircraft, and was designed to provide the flightcrew 
with a method of quickly determining how well the spacing operation was proceeding. 
When the time error was zero, the nose of the spacing aircraft would lie in the center of 
the conformance box. If the nose of the aircraft symbol moved outside the conformance 
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box, it meant that the error had moved beyond the “excessive error” bounds, triggering an 
EICAS message, and indicating that the flightcrew should cancel the operation. 
 
Figure 3.4. Three MCDU pages added in support of the spacing operation. 
 
Three pages were added to the MCDU to support the IM operation (Figure 3.4). 
There were considerable data available in the MCDU; however, it was desired that pilots 
would only use the MCDU to activate the spacing operation, and not have to reference it 
afterward. The first page contained information about the IM or RTA operations, such as 
the callsigns of the lead aircraft, the control method being used, the commanded end 
speed, the time error (for the aircraft going to the same runway), a distance error (for an 
aircraft going to the parallel runway), and the spacing aircraft’s final approach speed. It 
should be noted that the first MCDU page is the only location where the time error 
appeared. The reasoning behind this decision was suspected that the numerical 
representation of the time error would be misleading and result in confusion. The second 
and third pages of the MCDU contain additional information about the lead aircraft, such 
as their route, callsign, achieve by point, terminate point, and spacing interval.  
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The EICAS display provided advisories, warnings, and cautions to the flight crew 
(Table 3.1). Cautions could indicate the loss of ADS-B data, that a lead aircraft was off 
path, or that the time error passed the ‘excess error’ bounds. Advisories could indicate 
that the spacing aircraft’s path had errors, the spacing aircraft was off path, or if the lead 
aircraft had bad path information. Messages were designed to provide the flightcrew with 
increased awareness of the IM operation, and help them stay on track if they deviated too 
far from the commanded speed. The “IM DRAG REQUIRED“ message indicated if drag 
was required to conform with the commanded speed, and the “IM SPEED LIMITED” 
message notified the crew that the speed ASTAR was commanding was limited at 10% of 
the profile speed. The “IM AC 1/2 SPACING” message was used in the IM scenarios to 
notify the crew when they were in ADS-B range of their lead aircraft, and transitioned 
from an RTA operation to an IM operation. 
Table 3.1: IM EICAS cautions, advisories, and memos 
EICAS Message Alert Level 
IM DISENGAGED Caution 
IM AC 1/2 OFF PATH  Caution 
IM AC 1/2 ADSB LOST  Caution 
IM ERROR EXCESS Caution 
IM OWN BAD PATH Advisory 
IM OWN OFF PATH Advisory 
IM AC 1/2 BAD PATH  Advisory 
IM DRAG REQUIRED Memo 
IM SPEED LIMITED Memo 
IM AC 1/2 SPACING  Memo 
 
3.2.4. Experiment Design and Independent Variables 
Experiment Design 
The experiment investigated the effect of three error sources (no error, offset 
error, and wind error) and two control methods (RTA and IM) on arrivals to dependent 
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parallel runways [63]. In total, each group of pilots flew six distinct scenarios, and one 
exploratory scenario was conducted after the nominal scenarios were completed. Two 
replicates of each scenario containing an offset error or wind error were conducted, 
resulting in ten nominal runs and one exploratory run. Within this experiment, the 
scenarios without error served as a baseline, the offset error consisted of an impulse 
disturbance, and the wind error consisted of a discrepancy between forecast winds and 
actual winds. 
Table 3.2. The experiment design matrix (Data from RTA scenarios are ignored for this thesis) 
 
  CONTROL METHOD 
 













None Scenario 1 (Replicate 1) Scenario 2 (Replicate 1) 
Wind 
Scenario 3 (Replicate 1) 
                  (Replicate 2) 
Scenario 4 (Replicate 1) 
                  (Replicate 2) 
Offset 
Scenario 5 (Replicate 1) 
                  (Replicate 2) 
Scenario 6 (Replicate 1) 
                  (Replicate 2) 
 
 
The experiment utilized a split plot design [63]. Each crew was designated as a 
whole plot, and each simulator type was a whole-plot factor. Since each crew flew all of 
the scenarios, the scenarios were considered a subplot. Both the control method (RTA 
and IM), and the error source (no error, offset error, and wind error) were sub-plot factors 
(Table 3.2). 
Independent Variables 
The RTA control method’s goal was to help the aircraft arrive at the runway 
threshold at a precise time, and the IM control method’s goal was to achieve a precise 
interval behind one or two lead aircraft at the runway threshold. The RTA algorithm was 
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identical to the IM algorithm, with the dependency of the lead aircraft removed and 
replaced by an arrival time.  
The wind error was comprised of a discrepancy between the actual winds and the 
forecast winds (Figure 3.5). The discrepancy included a difference in both magnitude and 
direction, and was derived using actual NOAA winds and a Rapid Update Cycle weather 
model. The forecast winds were derived from the Rapid Update Cycle weather model 
with 13km resolution (RUC-13). This experiment used the RUC-13 error associated with 
a three hour forecast to simulate an event where flightcrew did not update the wind 
forecast prior to reaching TOD. Furthermore, the three hour forecast was multiplied by 
1.5 to simulate an instance where the RUC-13 model is less accurate due to rapidly 
changing weather conditions. The RUC-13 wind model (forecast winds) was compared to 
actual NOAA winds to obtain the difference between the actual winds and forecast winds 
for the wind error scenarios, and an additional wind shear was added at 5,000ft. The final 
wind speed error was approximately one standard deviation away from the mean forecast 
error at the surface and three standard deviations away at an altitude of 40,000 ft. Thus, 




Figure 3.5: The difference between the actual winds and forecast winds used in the wind error 
scenarios 
 
The offset error was a disturbance that was injected into the system when the first 
piloted aircraft’s lead descended below 9,000ft. The offset error was implemented 
differently in the IM scenarios and the RTA scenarios. In the IM scenarios, the aircraft in 
front of the first human piloted aircraft had its spacing interval increased by 30 seconds. 
This increase was allowed to propagate backwards through the stream. In the RTA 
scenarios, the aircraft in front of the first human piloted aircraft, and all of the aircraft 
arriving later than this aircraft, had their arrival times moved 30 seconds earlier. This 
involved sending an updated RTA CPDLC clearance to each aircraft. The offset error 
was designed to simulate an instance where ATC had to modify a spacing interval to fit 
an additional aircraft into the flow. 
The final scenario was an exploratory scenario, designed to examine various off-
nominal events. The exploratory scenario had a number of differences from the nominal 
scenarios. First, the spacing interval was decreased from 120 seconds to 75 seconds to 
simulate an arrival flow with greater density. Secondly, a new display element, the 
‘conformance box,’ was added. The conformance box is a green box that appears around 
Altitude (ft) Altitude (ft) 
 54 
the spacing aircraft on the ND (Figure 2.1). The purpose of the conformance box was to 
provide pilots with a way to easily see how well the spacing operation was proceeding. 
Lastly, there were a number of events that were included in the exploratory scenario. The 
most notable event was a go-around that pilots in a high fidelity two-crew simulator were 
required to conduct due to insufficient spacing. Events other simulators encountered 
included a clearance to space off an aircraft landing on runway 13R and an instance 
where a lead aircraft, who was originally on the same route, switched to a parallel 
runway. Pilots were briefed that this scenario was different than the rest, but were not 
told of specific circumstances that would occur during the scenario. 
3.3. Experiment Results 
Results from the experiment were collected and analyzed for statistical 
significance and indications of operations that did not go according to plan. Since this 
thesis is primarily concerned with IM, the RTA results were not included in the analysis. 
However, the RTA results along with the IM results can be found in [63], [72]. Despite 
the best efforts to concentrate on the IM results, the RTA results may have influenced the 
post-experiment questionnaire results. This is considered acceptable because the RTA 
and IM control methods used almost identical displays, the procedures were almost 
identical, and the comments that were observes were similar across the IM and RTA 
scenarios. The largest difference between the RTA and IM scenarios may have been the 
length of the CPDLC message that was sent. The RTA scenarios contained a significantly 
shorter CPDLC message. 
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This section will discusses the results of the experiment in four categories: 
workload and acceptance of IM, procedures and operational issues, interfaces, and the 
time it took pilots to complete time critical tasks. 
3.3.1. Workload and Acceptance of IM 
Before examining the interface and procedures, it is useful to ensure the pilots 
were able to achieve the desired performance. The main indicator of performance in the 
IM operation is the time error at the runway threshold. Table 3.3 shows that the time error 
at the runway threshold had mean values under three seconds and standard deviations 
below four seconds for all error sources. A statistical difference was found between the 
offset error and the wind error scenarios when the signed time error values were used 
(p=0.008). However, when the absolute value of the error was taken there were no 
statistically significant differences found, demonstrating that the spacing algorithm is 
able to achieve a high degree of precision even when large error sources are present. 
Table 3.3: Time error at the runway threshold 
 
Error Source Mean (sec) SD (sec) 
No Error -1.81 3.87 
Wind Error 0.90 3.91 
Offset Error -2.16 3.29 
 
 
Ratings of average and peak workload were collected, along with the phase of 
flight where the peak workload occurred. Pilots used the Modified Cooper Harper 
workload rating scale to rate their average and peak workloads on a scale from 1 
(favorable) to 10 (unfavorable). The results showed that the median pilot rating of their 
average workload was 2.0 (N = 120), and the median rating of their mean “peak” 
workload was 2.0 (N=120). A workload value of 2.0 indicates the task the pilots were 
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asked to perform was easy/desirable, their mental effort was low, and the desired 
performance was attainable. The data were averaged across replicates, blocked by 
crewmember, and a Friedman test was conducted to examine the data for statistical 
differences between error sources (using a 95% confidence interval). When the average 
workload was examined, no statistically significant effects were found between error 
source conditions (p=0.074); however, statistically significant effects were found when 
the peak workload was examined (p=0.032). Tukey simultaneous pairwise comparisons 
were used to determine which conditions were significantly different from each other. 
The results demonstrate that there were significant differences between the wind error 
scenarios and the scenarios without error, and significant differences between wind error 
scenarios and offset error scenarios. 












































Figure 3.6: From left to right; (a) a boxplot of the pilots' ratings of their average workload, (b) a 
boxplot of the pilots' ratings of their peak workload 
 
 
In addition to rating their average and peak workloads, pilots were asked to select 
the phase of flight where their peak workload occurred. The results showed that 70% of 
pilots’ peak workload occurred when they were on final approach and configuring their 
aircraft. These numbers were relatively consistent across all error conditions, and 
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consistent with the number of speed changes encountered during each of these phases of 
flight. However, it is unclear how the peak workload compares to current day operations.  
Table 3.4: Flight segment associated with peak workload (IM and RTA data combined) 
Segment of Flight Responses (N=191) 
>18,000ft (cruise, initial descent, CPDLC) 10% 
18,000ft – 11,000ft (descent, approach check) 3% 
11,000ft - 5,000ft (TRACON, low altitude merge) 17% 
<5,000ft (final approach, configure aircraft) 70% 
 
One measure of taskload is the number of speed changes that the pilots are given. 
The experiment results demonstrated that the number of speed changes provided to pilots 
tended to increase substantially when errors were introduced into the system. Statistically 
significant differences were found in the number of speed changes presented to the 
flightcrew for different error sources (p<0.001). A Tukey pairwise comparison test 
demonstrated that the number of speed changes was significantly different between each 
of the error sources, with the scenarios without error having the lowest number of speed 
changes and the scenarios with wind error having the highest number (Table 3.5). 
Furthermore, the results in Figure 3.7 (right) show that a significant portion of speed 
changes occurred within 30NM of the runway, explaining the workload results that 
indicated that the peak workloads occurred during the final phase of flight. Lastly, Figure 
3.7 (left) shows that a majority of speed changes occurred within one minute of the 
previous speed change, indicating that there are periods when multiple speed changes can 
occur during a short period of time. This is a function of the wind error and the design of 
the ASTAR speed control algorithm. Since the ASTAR speed control algorithm provides 
pilots with speed changes in 5 knot speed increments, when a very large error is 
encountered (such as the wind shear in the wind error scenarios), the algorithm will 
command a sequence of 5 knot speed changes. The total number of speed changes varied 
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depending on the error source and control method; however, the probability distributions 
shown in Figure 3.7 maintained a relatively similar shape. 
 
  
Figure 3.7: From left to right, a) a histogram of the time between consecutive speed changes, b) a 
histogram of where speed changes occurred as a function of distance from the runway (right). 
 
 
Table 3.5: Number of speed changes per treatment condition. 
Error Source Mean (sec) SD (sec) 
No Error 9.72 1.87 
Wind Error 16.11 3.32 
Offset Error 13.14 1.81 
 
 
Overall, pilots found the IM concept acceptable; however, pilots found some 
behaviors of the automation less than desirable. These behaviors included multiple speed 
changes within a short period of time, speed increases shortly followed by speed 
decreases, and speed increases when pilots were in the process of configuring the aircraft 
for landing. Pilots were asked to rate series of questions about their perceptions of the IM 
speeds using a scale that ranged from “1” (completely disagree) to “7” (completely 
agree), with “1” being the most favorable response and “7” being the most unfavorable 
response. The data was averaged across replicates, and a Friedman test was conducted to 
examine the data for statistical differences using a 95% confidence interval. The 
Freedman test was blocked by crew member, and examined whether the answers to the 
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questions changed when different error sources were present. No statistically significant 
differences were found between any of the experimental factors (p>0.05). However, both 
the question asking if IM was an interruption (p=0.068), and the question asking if the 
IM speed frustrated the crew (p=0.053) were close to being significant. For the IM 
scenarios, the wind error scenarios received the worst ratings for both the frustration 
question (M=2.5, SD=1.7) and the question asking about interruptions (M=2.7, SD=1.4). 
The non-error conditions received the most favorable ratings for both the frustration 
question (M=1.7, SD=1.1), and the question asking if pilots were interrupted (M=2.2, 
SD=1.1). While the difference in means may be small, they appear to be indicative of a 
greater number of outliers with unfavorable responses during the scenarios containing 
wind error (Figure 3.8). The results are also consistent with many comments pilots 
provided that stated that the speed guidance was too twitchy, or that the gains should be 
turned down. In general, the data suggests that the IM operation was acceptable during all 
of the error condition circumstances; nevertheless, the wind error and offset error 
scenarios had a greater chance of creating outlier ratings that were unacceptable. It is 
suspected that this occurred because of the large number of speed changes that were 
present in these conditions. It may be possible to decrease the frustration and 
interruptions by providing pilots with displays and procedures that show them why the 
algorithm is commanding specific speed changes, and increase their ability to predict the 
spacing algorithm’s behavior in the near future. Despite the frustration, there were only a 
few instances where pilots thought IM was unsafe. 
Table 3.6: Pilot ratings of speed commands across all conditions (IM Only) 
(1 = favorable, 7 = unfavorable) 
Question Mean SD Median P Value  
10 a) Unsafe 1.35 0.84 1 0.223 
10 b) Incorrect 1.47 0.99 1 0.282 
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10 c) Interruption 2.48 1.55 2 0.068 
10 d) Unexpected 2.12 1.57 1 0.247 
10 e) Conflicted With Other Information 1.68 1.18 1 0.793 
10 f) Uncomfortable 1.56 1.24 1 0.341 









Rating (1 = Favorable, 7 = Unfavorable)
Speed Guidance Questions (Question 10, a-g)
 
Figure 3.8: Pilot responses to post run question ten regarding the acceptability of the commanded 
speeds (IM only) 
 
It is useful to understand some of the outliers in the ratings provided by pilots. Of 
particular interest are the three instances where the flightcrew slightly agreed that the IM 
operation was unsafe and the two instances when they provided a neutral rating. Some of 
these ratings were caused by a simulator glitch, which commanded the pilots to fly at 
Mach 0.85 prior to their TOD. Other comments indicated that ASTAR waited until a 
point after the FAF to command the aircraft’s final approach speed (this will occur if the 
aircraft is below the profile speed), and because pilots were not given adequate time to 
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slow their aircraft to meet the 250 knot speed limit at 10,000 ft. The two neutral 
comments were provided because pilots had to reconfigure the aircraft to achieve the 
commanded speed, and because they spent too much time monitoring the PFD for 
commanded speed changes.  
The ratings that indicated that the commanded speeds were incorrect were 
provided because of commanded speed increases that were shortly followed by speed 
decreases, ASTAR commanding the final approach speed after the FAF, and because 
speed changes occurred too frequently. The ratings that stated that speed changes 
occurred too frequently occurred during wind error scenarios and to a lesser extent during 
the offset error scenarios. It is possible that providing pilots with displays that showed 
how ASTAR works, and why they were given speed commands could decrease the 
perception that some speed changes are incorrect.  
There were also ratings that indicated that the spacing algorithm could interrupt 
pilots. This interruption can be caused by pilots’ inability to predict commanded speed 
changes. The ratings that were often provided because of frequent speed changes, and 
speed changes that did not allow the flightcrew to configure their aircraft as early as they 
would have liked.  
Ratings that indicated the commanded speeds were unexpected, conflicted with 
information available from other sources, and caused discomfort were often provided 
because the pilots thought there were too many speed changes within a short period of 
time.  
Ratings indicating that pilots were frustrated included speed changes that were 
very frequent, speed changes that did not make sense to the flight crew, speed changes 
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that forced pilots to reconfigure their aircraft, and the need to use an excessive amount to 
speed brakes.  
 It should be remembered the poor ratings represented a small number of runs, 
and that many of them were instigated by large error sources that pilots are not expected 
to encounter very often. Nevertheless, these ratings can provide insight into what 
behavior pilots find unacceptable. 
3.3.2. Procedures and Operational Issues 
Overall, pilots rated the procedures used in this experiment as acceptable; 
however, there were a number of instances where flight crews did not follow the 
procedures, or they used less than desirable behavior to follow the procedures. When 
asked if the IM procedures used during this experiment were complete, accurate, and 
logical, 92% of the pilots answered positively. However, when asked to use a scale of 1 
(Very Difficult) to 7 (Very Easy) to rate the ease with which the spacing procedures 
could be integrated with current day procedures, the pilots’ mean response was 4.58 (SD 
= 1.56, N = 24), indicating that they were somewhat undecided. Problems that were seen 
with the procedures included tasks associated with activating the IM operation, instances 
where the flightcrew did not follow the procedures, and instances where pilots followed 
the procedures, but found the behavior non-ideal.  
Pilot comments indicated that there were two problems with the procedures used 
in this experiment: both of which occurred when accepting a new clearance and 
activating ASTAR. When pilots were asked to amend the spacing operation, they were 
required to terminate the existing clearance, and then go through the process of loading 
the new clearance. Many pilots mixed up the order of this task, and suggested that the old 
 63 
clearance should automatically terminate when new or amended information was entered. 
The main reason for not implementing this feature in the first place was that it required 
two instances of ASTAR running; one to compute the commanded speeds for the existing 
operation, and one to compute an initial commanded speed for the appended operation to 
allow the flightcrew to determine if it is acceptable or not. In the full crew simulators, 
pilot coordination was needed to set up the spacing operation, because they were required 
to have the IM MCDUU page and the CPDLC MCDU page open at the same time. The 
PNF was expected to read and respond to the CPDLC clearance, and the PF was expected 
to activate the spacing algorithm and execute it if the initial commanded speed looked 
acceptable. Pilots felt this entire operation should be able to be completed by the PNF on 
a single MCDU.  One flight crew even worked around the procedures by having the PNF 
reach across the center console to input commands into the PF’s MCDU. 
In some scenarios, the use of IM caused less than desirable behavior when pilots 
were configuring their aircraft.  In 10 out of 180 runs, pilots either reconfigured their 
aircraft to conform to a new commanded speed (as instructed by the procedures), or used 
improper landing flaps. Of these instances, only one occurred in a high fidelity two-crew 
simulator, indicating that the simulation environment may have played a role in this 
behavior. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine these incidents. Many of the flap 
reconfigurations were caused by ASTAR speed approaching the flap limit speeds. 
Additionally, pilot comments in the questionnaires and group debrief suggested that some 
of them had used their flaps as a mechanism to create enough drag to slow the aircraft. 
One pilot, who flew one of the single-crew desktop simulators with the commanded 
speed automatically managed by the FMS, over sped his flaps because he momentarily 
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paid attention to something other than his commanded speed. There was also at least one 
case where pilot flying in the high fidelity two-crew IFD simulator did not follow the 
commanded speed to keep them from having to reconfigure their aircraft, as described by 
the pilot comment: 
“Computer commanded a speed above my current maximum Flaps 30 speed. I 
increase my speed to within 5kts of max F30 speed, but still well below the 
commanded speed.” 
ASTAR has a flap protection feature that was turned off for this experiment. It may be 
useful to use the flap limiting feature when the FMS is automatically controlling the 
commanded speeds. Otherwise, there is the potential for small lapses in attention to result 
in the aircraft over speeding the flaps. Flap protection may also be useful in 
implementations where pilots are required to dial the commanded speed into the MCP 
speed window and if the procedures dictate that pilots fly the commanded speed, because 
it might increase speed conformance.  
One important operational and procedural issue is that pilots did not always 
follow the speed guidance commanded by ASTAR, as dictated by the procedures. 
Approximately ten instances were found where pilots did not dial a new commanded 
speed into their MCDU for an extended period of time during the ILS portion of their 
approach. As with the flap deployment problems, many of these instances occurred in the 
single pilot simulators, indicating that the simulation environment may have played a 
role. The procedures and training told pilots that they should follow the speed commands 
unless they did not think they were appropriate, in which case they were required to 
cancel the operation. The pilots who did deviate from the commanded speeds did not 
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contact ATC to cancel the operation. It is unclear if this is a function of the simulation 
environments (i.e. that they did not want to ruin a data run), or an issue that would be 
encountered in the real world. One of the IFD pilots commented on his rationale for not 
following his commanded speed: 
 “Between ZINGG and JIFFY, the IM speed called for a 5 knot speed increase 
followed by another 5 knot increase just outside of JIFFY FAF. I did not try to chase 
the speed because it was over JIFFY, we prepared for landing and speed reduction.” 
It is hypothesized that the OPDs used in this experiment contributed to some of the 
behavior that pilots found undesirable. The OPDs used in this experiment were designed 
as near idle descents. If a spacing aircraft developed a positive time error (projecting they 
would arrive late), the aircraft would be given a commanded speed that is faster than the 
nominal speed of the 4D trajectory. These faster speeds would often require the 
flightcrew to use drag to slow the aircraft in time to achieve a stabilized approach. Pilot 
comments during the verbal debrief indicated that some pilots thought they had to use 
speed brakes too often to slow their aircraft, causing concern about passenger comfort. It 
is possible that some of the use of speed brakes could have been avoided if pilots had 
better awareness of their aircraft’s energy. 
3.3.3. Pilot Interface 
Qualitative data was collected on the pilot’s use of the IM displays. Most of this 
data was gathered from the ratings and comments pilots provided in the post-run 
questionnaire; however, some of the comments were also taken from the post-experiment 
questionnaire. Since the post-experiment questionnaire only included 24 responses, 
statistical analysis was not used on that data. 
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Pilots were asked to rate the usefulness of each display element on a scale ranging 
from Detrimental to Required for IM (Figure 3.9). Pilots generally provided high 
usefulness ratings to all of the IM displays on the PFD. This was expected, because the 
IM operating procedure used in this experiment dictated that pilots act off of information 
that was presented on the PFD. The green box that appeared around the commanded end 
speed to indicate a speed change received lower ratings than the other indications on the 
PFD. Pilot comments suggested that the lower ratings were provided because pilots did 
not find the green box salient enough, and found themselves watching the commanded 
end speed on the PFD to try and catch any speed changes. Of the 24 pilot participants, 23 
stated that better alerting of changes to the commanded speed were needed.  
The highest rated display element on the ND was the visual representation of the 
lead aircraft (i.e. the double chevron or diamond depicting the lead aircraft). With the 
exception of visual representations of the lead aircraft, the IM displays on the ND were 
rated as less useful than those on the PFD; however, pilots still found them moderately 
useful to highly useful.  
The displays on the MCDU were also given lower usefulness ratings than the 
displays on the PFD. The intent was that the pilots would use the information on the 
MCDU to activate the IM operation, and not have to reference it afterwards. To support 
this, a lot of the important information present on the MCDU was also present on the 
PFD or ND. Thus, the lower ratings of the MCDU display elements were expected. The 
EICAS messages also received lower ratings. Pilot comments indicate that this was 
caused by a number of factors. The “IM DRAG REQUIRED” message appeared when 
the airspeed of the aircraft was greater  than six knots above the instantaneous 
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commanded speed (shown by the speed bug), and turned off when they were within four 
knots of the commanded speed. Pilot comments indicated that there were a number of 
instances when the “IM DRAG REQUIRED” message appeared, but they thought their 
aircraft were slowing at an adequate rate. Additionally, a number of pilots seemed to 
view the “IM SPD LIMITED” message, which notified them when the commanded speed 
deviation was limited to ±10% of the profile speed, as a nuisance alert. 
To determine how often pilots used each display, they were asked to rate how 
frequently they referenced each of the major aircraft displays containing IM information 
using a scale ranging from 1” (Never) to “5” (All the Time). Ratings provided by the 
participants indicated that they monitored the PFD more frequently than any other 
display. This is consistent with the usefulness ratings that were previously discussed. IM 
information on the ND was referenced less often than the PFD, but more often than the 
MCDU. This is also consistent with the usefulness ratings previously discussed. The 
MCDU was only referenced slightly to moderately often. A design goal of the MCDU 
interface was that pilots should not have to reference it very often after the spacing 
operation was activated to allow pilots to use the MCDU for other tasks; thus, limited 
monitoring of the MCDU was seen as a desirable characteristic.  
In addition to describing how often they referenced different displays, the pilots 
who flew in the two-crew simulators were asked how often they referenced the 
information out the window, and how often they referenced information from their 
crewmember. In general, pilots did not reference information out the window very often. 
This was probably due to the fact that a majority of the arrival was flown in IFR 
conditions. However, pilots in the two-crew simulators did reference information from 
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their crew members very often. This was apparent when observing the experiment, as 
pilots would often call out speed changes when they occurred to ensure that both the PNF 
and PF had consistent information. 
 
Figure 3.9: Pilot ratings of display elements used in the experiment (N=24) 
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Figure 3.10: Pilots ratings regarding how often they monitored particular displays while conducting 
IM 
 
In addition to the usefulness and frequency of use of the IM displays, pilots were 
asked whether they were able to predict the behavior of the spacing algorithm. Using a 
scale of scale of 1 (Completely Disagree) to 7 (Completely Agree), pilots moderately 
agreed that the spacing tool behaves in a predictable manner (M=6.04, SD=0.55, N=24), 
and that they were able to predict commanded speeds before they occurred (M=5.36, 
SD=1.37, N=180). Pilots were asked to describe the information that helped them predict 
the spacing algorithm, and their answers were binned by their content. 46% of pilots 
stated that they used the first IM MCDU page to help predict the algorithm’s behavior, 
which was the only location that contained the spacing error values. 46% used published 
speed profiles, scheduled speed decreases, and general flight rules to predict the IM 
spacing algorithm. Lastly, 29% used the visual representation of their lead aircraft on the 
ND. Fully predicting impending speed changes is not possible with the ASTAR 
algorithm because it uses the current state of the aircraft to calculate the commanded 
speed; however, pilots felt they were able to predict general behavior that the algorithm 
used, including scheduled speed decreases, what constituted a high or low spacing error, 
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general trends between the time error and the commanded speed, and general trends 
between the pilots actions and the commanded speed. Nevertheless, pilot comments 
indicated that may not have formed an accurate mental model of the ASTAR algorithm. 
Thus, it is possible that pilots thought they were able to predict the ASTAR algorithm, 
but in actuality, their predictions were incorrect. 
A number of the comments that pilots provided suggested that they were 
attempting to understand the relationship between the time error that was displayed on 
the MCDU and the speeds commands generated by ASTAR. The following comments 
demonstrate that pilots often had an incorrect or incomplete mental model of the 
relationship between the time error displayed on the MCDU and the commanded speed 
changes. 
 “Maybe with more experience I'd have a better feel for what speed will be coming 
next, but even when we seem to be ahead of our goal (time) we still get commands 
to speed up.” 
 “Lots of airspeed changes on final some of which seemed inappropriate. Several 
IM airspeed changes around FAF.  I didn't understand why it was asking for 165 
then 150 then 155 and back to 165 (I think that was the order) when we were still 
showing 10 sec early.” 
 “The conformance box was the easiest method to predict performance and trends.  
Without it I had to refer to the IM page in the CDU.  Even then it was difficult to 
predict the next commanded speed.  On several occasions when I checked the IM 
page it showed me as much as 23 sec ahead of schedule and yet it subsequently 
commanded a speed increase.” 
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 “I was looking at the IM page and noting error in the progress.  For example, if I 
noticed it was late and trending later, it was easy to expect that there was a 
change coming for an increase.” 
Based on these comments, it appears as if some pilots thought that speed changes would 
only increase if the time error was positive (arriving late), and only decrease if the time 
error was negative (arriving early). In reality, the commanded speed will move toward 
the nominal profile speed as the time error moves toward zero. This means that if the 
time error is increasing, the commanded speed will increase, and if the time error is 
decreasing, the commanded speed will decrease (regardless of the value of the time 
error). The pilot that provided the final comment was close to figuring this relationship 
out; however, the commanded speed will increase if the time error increases, even if the 
aircraft is early. Overall, the pilots’ confusion appears to be centered on the relationship 
between the ASTAR commanded speed and the time error. The subject of chapters four 
and five will describe a set of rules that can explain ASTAR’s behavior, and chapter five 
will explore how these rules can be conveyed to the flightcrew to help them understand 
ASTAR’s behavior. 
The conformance box was created to show pilots a snapshot of how well they 
were completing the spacing operation. The conformance box is a green box that appears 
around the depiction of the spacing aircraft on the ND during the exploratory scenario 
(see Figure 3.3), and was designed to indicate excessive error bounds (i.e. error values 
where the flightcrew would be expected to cancel the operation). The pilots were asked a 
number of questions about the conformance box in the post-experiment questionnaire. In 
general, the results showed that pilots liked the conformance box. Using a scale of 
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1(Completely Disagree) to 7 (Completely Agree), pilots slightly to moderately agreed 
that the conformance box helped them monitor the IM operation (M=5.29, SD=1.78, 
N=24) and that the conformance box should be part of any display designed to support 
IM operations (M=5.36, SD=1.62, N=24). However, the pilots were only neutral to 
slightly in agreement with the statements that the conformance box helped them predict 
speed changes (M=4.75, SD=1.80, N=24), that it increased the level of safety of IM 
(M=4.75, SD=1.78, N=24), or that it increased their comfort with IM (M=4.88, SD=1.98, 
N=24). This data is consistent with what Volk found when he investigate a number of IM 
displays: pilots liked the conformance box, but it was not clear how it helped them [64].  
Comments from the post run questionnaire also showed problems with the 
conformance box. Most notably, when pilots changed the scale on the ND, the 
conformance box changed its size; there were a small number of pilots who flew or 
wanted to fly (and were stopped by their crewmember) speeds that were different than the 
commanded speed to decrease their time error more quickly. Lastly, some pilots 
interpreted the conformance box as a separation box, and attempted to keep other aircraft 
out. Some of these effects may have been cause by the delay between the training (on the 
first day) and the exploratory scenario (on the third day). In the end, the conformance box 
provided pilots a snapshot of their time error relative to the “excessive error” bounds. 
However, it did not help pilots understand why they were receiving particular speed 
commands, or help the pilots obtain an accurate mental model of ASTAR. This is 
demonstrated by the following quote: 
“The conformance box was the easiest method to predict performance and trends.  
Without it I had to refer to the IM page in the CDU.  Even then it was difficult to 
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predict the next commanded speed.  On several occasions when I checked the IM 
page it showed me as much as 23 sec ahead of schedule and yet it subsequently 
commanded a speed increase.” 
This comment suggests that while the conformance box provided pilots with an easy way 
to determine how well the spacing operation was proceeding, it did not help them 
understand the rationale behind the commanded speeds or provide them with a more 
accurate mental model of IM. The pilot made the same mistake that was present in 
previous comments: that a negative (early) time error meant that the commanded speeds 
would always decrease. 
3.3.4. Time Sensitive Tasks 
In addition to the data on pilot acceptability, procedures, and interfaces, data was 
collected on the amount of time it took the flight crew to complete specific time sensitive 
tasks. There are three main time sensitive tasks in the IM system: sending/responding to 
CPDLC clearance from ATC, responding to commanded speed changes, and controller 
intervention. Because the IMSPiDR experiment was scripted and did not include actual 
controllers, the controller intervention point was not examined in this experiment.  
Baxley (2011) conducted an extensive analysis of the amount of time it took 
pilots to read and respond to the CPDLC message [72]. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) stated that the time for the entire CPDLC process should be less 
than 210 or 350 seconds, depending on the equipage of the aircraft [77].  The time 
allocated for the aircraft to send a response is 60 seconds. Data from the IMSPiDR 
experiment showed that the mean response time for all of the IM runs was 52 seconds 
(SD=19, N=60) for the two crew simulators, and 40 seconds (SD=10, N=118) for the 
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single-crew simulators [72]. Significant difference in response time were found between 
the ATOL and the IFD/DTS (p=0.002). The ATOL had the lower response time (M=40, 
SD=10, N=118), and IFD and DTS had a mean response time of 52 seconds (SD=19, 
N=60). It is suspected that this difference occurred because the pilots in the two-crew 
simulators had to coordinate efforts to read the CPDLC message, activate ASTAR, and 
respond to the message; whereas the pilots in the single-crew simulators did not have to 
coordinate with a crewmember. The time taken for the two crew simulators to respond to 
the IM CPDLC message was fairly close to the 60 second limit discussed by the ICAO. 
The initial hypothesis was that this was caused by the complicated message sent during 
the IM scenarios that contained IM clearances for two aircraft (including their 
trajectories), and an RTA clearance that the spacing aircraft was expected to fly until it 
was in range of its lead aircraft. However, no statistical differences were found between 
the response times for the IM scenarios and the RTA scenarios, which had a significantly 
shorter CPDLC clearance. 
The time pilots took to notice and respond to commanded speeds were examined, 
and compared with assumptions made by ASTAR. To complete the analysis, the response 
time data was averaged for each run. If a new speed change occurred before the pilot 
reacted to the old speed change, the reaction time for that particular speed change was 
considered to be the time between the two speed changes. The square root of the response 
data was taken to transform it into a normal distribution. Normally reaction times would 
be transformed using a logarithmic transformation; however, a square root transformation 
provided a better, though not perfect, approximation of a normal distribution in this case 
(Figure 3.11, b). When the square root of the reaction time was analyzed, significant 
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differences were found between the error source and the simulator type. A Tukey 
pairwise comparison test revealed that the reaction times of the scenarios without error 
were statistically different than the reaction times of the scenarios with offset error and 
wind error, with the scenarios without error having a higher reaction time (Table 3.7). It 
is hypothesized that the scenarios without error had a larger reaction time because they 
had fewer speed changes, and the pilots may not have been looking for them as 
diligently. In addition to collecting data on the reaction time of pilots to speed changes, 
pilots were asked to provide the amount of time they thought would be reasonable to 
notice and implement a speed change. On average, pilots’ responses in the post 
experiment questionnaire stated they would consider noticing the speed change within 
nine seconds (SD=5, N=24)  of a commanded speed change, and dialing the speed 
commands into the MCP speed window within seven seconds (SD=4, N=24) of noticing 
the speed command as acceptable. These numbers are consistent with the 10 seconds that 
was assumed. 
Table 3.7: The reaction time of the scenarios without error was significantly greater than the wind 
and offset error scenarios 
Error Source Mean (sec) SD (sec) 
No Error 10.4 10.7 
Wind Error 8.8 8.9 






































Figure 3.11: From left to right, (a) A histogram of pilot reaction times to commanded speed changes 
for all scenarios, (b) A plot showing how well the square root of reaction time conformed to a normal 
distribution (a perfect fit would follow the blue line) 
 
3.4. Summary 
An experiment was conducted at NASA Langley, examining the flightdeck 
implementation of IM. The experiment examined IM and RTA control methods under 
three different perturbations: No error, an impulse perturbation (offset error), and a 
discrepancy between actual winds and forecast winds (wind error).The participants in the 
experiment flew arrivals from a point just prior to the TOD to the runway threshold. 
During this time, pilots were asked to review and respond to a CPDLC message 
containing either an IM or RTA clearance. Pilots were expected to accept the clearance 
and fly speed guidance generated by onboard avionics to the final approach fix, after 
which they flew their final approach speed. A variety of metrics were collected during the 
experiment, including aircraft state data, questionnaires administrated to the pilots, and a 
group debrief session at the end of the experiment. 
The results of the experiment demonstrated pilot acceptance of the IM operation 
and IM procedures. In general, pilots provided positive feedback despite the significant 
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perturbations present in a majority of the scenarios. However, the perturbations instigated 
some behavior that the pilots found less than acceptable. The less than acceptable 
behavior included instances where there were multiple speed changes were given within a 
short period of time, periods where a commanded speed increase was shortly followed by 
a speed decrease, and instances where achieving the commanded speed forced pilots to 
reconfigure their aircraft.  
Pilot comments also suggested that they were attempting to form a mental model 
of the relationship between the time error presented on the MCDU and the ASTAR 
commanded speeds. Their mental model of the IM system was often incorrect and/or 
incomplete. It is suspected that their incorrect/incomplete mental model made the speed 
changes look random and indecisive, which could have resulted in increased frustration. 
It is hypothesized that creating display, procedures, and/or training that helps pilots 
establish an accurate mental model of the IM system will result in increased acceptability 
and frustration when significant perturbations are present. 
Time data, feedback on the procedures and interface, and knowledge incurred 
from observing pilots will be used to build a joint HTA and WDA model in the next 
chapter. The WDA and HTA model will be used to help determine interfaces and 
procedures that have the potential to help pilots and/or air traffic controllers gain a better 
understanding of the IM system. It is hypothesized that a more complete and correct 
mental model of the system will increase the acceptability of IM, increase pilots’ 
understanding of the commanded speeds they are provided, and decrease frustration when 
perturbations are present. 
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4.   CHAPTER 4 
HTA, CTA, and WDA MODEL OF IM 
4.  
4.1. Introduction 
This section describes a Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), Control Task 
Analysis (CTA), and Work Domain Analysis (WDA) of the Interval Management (IM) 
system. These models were created using information from the literature review 
conducted in chapter two and from the Interval Management with Spacing to Parallel 
Dependent Runways (IMSPiDR) Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) experiment discussed in 
the previous chapter. The WDA portion of the model will then be used in chapter 5 to 
derive representations for the IM system that can help pilots understand the constraints 
and dynamics of the IM system, aiding them when unforeseen circumstances are 
encountered. The HTA is used to examine the procedures expected for IM during both 
normal conditions and foreseen non-normal conditions. The CTA is used to describe the 
decision making process the human operators use when conducting control tasks, and 
determine the information needed to support the decision making process. The HTA, 
CTA, and WDA created in this chapter assume that the ASTAR algorithm is used as the 
spacing algorithm. Using a different algorithm would likely create different dynamics and 
procedures requiring changes to the models, and changes to the displays and 
representations developed next in chapter 5. 
This chapter first discusses the HTA, which is used to describe a nominal course 
of behavior air traffic controllers and flight crews can used to complete the IM operation, 
followed by a CTA used to describe the information pilots need to make decisions 
pertaining to IM. Next a WDA is used to describe the dynamics of the IM system. Lastly, 
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the chapter concludes with a discussion of the benefits of using HTA, CTA, and WDA 
together. 
4.2. Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
4.2.1. Task Requirements 
An HTA was developed to examine the tasks flightcrews are expected to use 
during normal and anticipated non-normal conditions. The HTA was developed from 
referencing a variety of sources, including the IMSPiDR HITL experiment and the 
literature.  The purpose of the HTA is to ensure that tasks are adequately supported, that 
priority information receives appropriate emphasis, and that displays are placed in the 
correct locations. 
Different definitions have been used in the literature for nominal and off-nominal 
events. Events can be split into three categories: normal events that occur every day; non-
normal events that do not occur every day, but have been anticipated and have defined 
procedures; and unanticipated non-normal events for which there is no procedure. This 
thesis uses the term nominal to refer to both normal events and anticipated non-normal 
events, and the term off-nominal to refer to unanticipated events.  
4.2.2. Task Analysis 
An HTA of the IM system was completed to describe nominal tasks that the 
flightcrew and ATC need to complete to operate the IM system (Figure 3.1 and Figure 
3.2, respectively). The system goal of the HTA was to achieve a precise spacing interval 
behind a lead aircraft at the runway threshold. By achieving this goal, IM is expected to 
complete its functional purpose of increasing the runway throughput and enabling fuel 
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efficient OPD arrivals during periods of high traffic. The system goal was split into three 
main tasks: initiating IM, conducting IM, and terminating IM.  
Initializing IM occurs when an air traffic controller provides an IM clearance 
(Task 1 in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). The parameters that are included in the clearance 
include a lead aircraft, an achieve-by point, a spacing interval, the route of the lead 
aircraft, and the lead aircraft’s final approach speed if the achieve-by point is a runway. 
Once the IM clearance is received, the flightcrew is responsible for entering the 
information into onboard avionics, which generates an initial commanded speed. Using 
this information, the flightcrew is expected to determine whether or not the IM clearance 
is acceptable. If it is acceptable the flightcrew will execute the clearance; if it is not 
acceptable they cancel the clearance.  
Once the IM operation is activated, the flightcrew is responsible for using 
guidance provided by onboard automation to achieve their assigned spacing interval, and 
ATC is responsible for monitoring for impending separation violations (Task 2 in Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.2). Nominally, the flightcrew is expected to follow the speed commands 
provided by onboard guidance. If the flightcrew does not believe the speed commands are 
acceptable, they can cancel the IM clearance and wait for Air Traffic Control (ATC) to 
provide further guidance. If there is a problem, ATC can either choose to amend the 
original IM clearance with a new spacing interval, suspend the IM operation so they can 
provide temporary speed commands, vectors, or terminate the IM operation.  
The IM operation can be terminated if the flightcrew find the commanded speeds 
unacceptable during any portion of the flight, if there is an ASTAR error that appears, if 
ATC decides to terminate the operation, or if the achieve-by point is reached (Task 3 in 
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Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). If ATC cancels the clearance, they should immediately 
provide further instructions to the flightcrew. If the flightcrew terminates the clearance, 
they are required to notify ATC and wait for further instructions. 
Tasks that require communication with ATC and the flightdeck are outlined with 
an orange box, and the tasks that required pilots and air traffic controllers to make 
decisions are highlighted with blue shading. All of the communications between ATC 
and the flightdeck are provided by clearances unless the IM operations is canceled or 








 Do 1.1.3 if clearance parameters 
appear reasonable















































































 Do 1 if an IM clearance is received from ATC
 Do 2 if clearance is acceptable and successfully input
 Do 3 if  the crew does not find the speed acceptable, 
there are ASTAR errors, the spacing error exceeds the 
excess error bounds, ATC overrides the spacing 
operation, or if the achieve-by point is reached
Plan 1:
 Do 1.1 if a IM clearance is received
 Do 1.2 if clearance appears reasonable
 Do 1.3
 Do 1.4 if IM clearance is acceptable









 Do 2.2 when RTA to IM switch occurs
 Do 2.2 if the cmd. speed changes
 Do 2.3 if  aircraft speed does not match 
the cmd. speed
 Do 2.4 if amended clearance is received 
 Do 2.5 if ATC or flightcrew suspends IM
Plan 3:
 Do 3.1 if the aircraft has 
reached the termination 
point, and exit
 Do 3.2 if the operation is 
terminated prior to the 
achieve-by point














































 Do 2.6.1 if flightcrew initiates suspension
 Do 2.6.2
 Do 2.6.3




















= A task that requires a 
decision
= A task that requires 
coordination with ATC
2.2.Notify 
ATC that AC 
is IM spacing
Figure 4.1: Flightdeck task analysis 
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 Do 1 if there is potential benefit from the IM operation
 Do 2 flightcrew accepts IM clearance
 Do 3 if there is a need to prevent a separation violation 
or reorganize the flow
Plan 1:
 Do 1.1 if a IM clearance is received
 Do 1.2 if eligible aircraft are present
 Do 1.3 if there is an eligible spacing 
aircraft and lead aircraft
 Do 1.4, marking RTA if an RTA was given 
with the IM clearance and IM if no RTA 
was given (aircraft in ADS-B range)
Plan 2:
 Do 2.1
 Do 2.2 if the cmd. speed changes
 Do 2.3 if there is a short term deviation 
needed from the IM trajectory/speed
 Do  2.4 if aircraft calls and says they are 
IM spacing
Plan 3:
 Do 3.1 if the aircraft has reached the 
termination point
 Do 3.2 if the operation is terminated 

















 Do 2.1.3 when the instructions are 
completed (could also be given as a 




resume IM  
Plan 2.4:
 Do 2.4.1
 Do 2.4.2 if amended clearance 































 Do 2.2.2 if a FIM equipped 
aircraft is present
 Do 2.2.3 if an aircraft 
equipped with ADS-B out is 
ahead of the FIM aircraft
 Do 1.2.4 if previous 
conditions are met
= A task that requires a 
decision










Figure 4.2: ATC task analysis
 
84 
4.3. Control Task Analysis (CTA) 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, CTA can be used to examine the decision process that 
a human decision maker uses, or is expected to use. CTA was originally introduced as the 
second phase of Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA); however, it can also be used to 
examine tasks within the HTA. The HTA of the flightdeck demonstrated that there are 
two major IM tasks that required the flightcrew to make a decision: deciding whether to 
accept or reject a new or amended IM clearance, and deciding whether the IM 
commanded speeds are acceptable. It is useful to examine the decision making process 
that pilots can use when completing these tasks. 
The first task that the flightcrew must complete is determining whether an IM 
clearance is acceptable (Figure 4.3). Moving from the bottom left of the decision ladder, 
the flightcrew first receives either a full IM clearance or an amendment to a previously 
provided clearance. The IM clearance contains parameters such as the IM achieve-by 
point, the callsign of the lead aircraft, its route, the spacing goal, and an RTA time if the 
aircraft are not in ADS-B range. Depending on the exact implementation of IM, there can 
also be additional parameters such as the lead aircraft’s Mach to Calibrated Airspeed 
(CAS) transition speed. Once the clearance is received the flightcrew loads it into the IM 
automation, which generates a commanded speed. At this time the spacing algorithm 
checks that the lead aircraft is on the selected route and that the aircraft will likely null 
the time error by the achieve-by point. If either of these conditions are false, the spacing 
algorithm will provide the flightcrew with an error message. If the commanded speed is 
within the speed constraints imposed by the aircraft, within any regulatory constraints, if 
the commanded speed is acceptable to the pilot for the current conditions, and if the 
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spacing algorithm does not generate any errors, the flightcrew should accept the 
commanded speed (the leap from “alert” to “plan” in Figure 4.3). The top portion of the 
CTA is mostly undefined because it is expected that the flightcrew will reject the 































 Receive and IM 
clearance
 Receive an IM 
clearance amendment
 Contents of clearance
 Initial spacing error
 Initial commanded speed
 Current aircraft constraints
 Accept clearance or 
amendment
 Reject clearance or 
amendment
 Accept clearance or 
amendment
 Reject clearance or 
amendment
Cmd. Speed is within 
aircraft constraints 
and is likely to be in 
the near future
 




A second control task the flightcrew must complete is determining whether they 
should continue with the IM operation (Figure 4.4). This task is a monitoring function 
that should be conducted whenever a flightcrew is conducting an IM operation. First, the 
flightcrew should observe pertinent information including current aircraft state, speed 
constraints, the value of the commanded speed, that the time error is reasonable, and any 
error messages provided by automated checks the spacing algorithm does. These checks 
include ensuring that the spacing algorithm is on path, that the lead aircraft is on its path, 
that a valid ADS-B signal is being received from the lead aircraft, and that the spacing 
interval is achievable. If a commanded speed change occurs and the flightcrew knows 
that the commanded speed is acceptable given the aircraft’s current state, they can 
execute the new commanded speed (shown by the shunt from “alert” to “execute” in 
Figure 4.4). If the spacing algorithm gives an error message, the flightcrew can use the 
information from that message, look up the appropriate procedure and execute that 
procedure (shown by the shunt from “info” to “develop plan and use procedures” in 
Figure 4.4). There may also be cases where the flightcrew may use their judgment to 
determine whether they should or should not continue with the spacing operation. These 
cases may be triggered by weather phenomena, non-ideal behavior by the lead aircraft, or 
a series of questionable speed changes. During these cases, the flightcrew must examine 
options and determine an appropriate course of action. Once that course of action is 
chosen, the flightcrew can reference any applicable procedures (shown by the leap from 






























Determine whether t 
continue the IM operation
 Conducting IM 
operation
 IM commanded speed
 Time error
 Aircraft’s current speed
 Aircraft’s speed constraints 
(i.e. flap speed limits)
 Any ASTAR errors, cautions, 
or warnings
 Aircraft’s speed constraints
 Aircraft’s altitude relative 
to path
 Environmental conditions 
(i.e. weather)
 Regulations
 Aircraft equipment failures
 Match commanded speed
 Cancel IM operation
 Temporarily suspend IM operation 
and notify ATC
 Fly speed other than commanded 
speed without ATC permission 
(disobey procedures)
Choose one of the options, 
and determine the benefits 
and consequences of that 
option
 Use procedures (desired)
 Use a user defined plan
 Size of spacing error  and 
distance to the runway
 Commanded speed in 
relation to aircraft 
constraints
 ADS-B connectivity
See new cmd. speed 
and use aircraft 
controls achieve it
See ASTAR error, and 
use appropriate 
procedure
Determine course of 
action and use 
developed procedure
 
Figure 4.4: The decision ladder showing how pilots are expected to determine if they should continue 
the IM operation 
 
4.4. Insights into Design from Task Analysis 
The HTA showed that the IM operation can be split into three major parts: 
Activating the spacing operation, conducting the spacing operation, and terminating the 
spacing operation. This is true for both the flightdeck and ATC. There are a few tasks that 
involve communications between ATC and the flightdeck. The flightcrew is able to 
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contact ATC and cancel the operation at any time. ATC can contact the flightcrew to 
provide an update clearance, or suspend a clearance so vectors can be initiated. This 
clearance may contain a change in spacing interval or trajectory. These updates are 
expected to occur if speed control is not sufficient to fix the spacing error, or if ATC must 
make space for an additional aircraft. If the operation is terminated prematurely (prior to 
reaching the achieve-by point), it is the responsibility of ATC to provide the aircraft with 
future speed instructions. The flightcrew can terminate the spacing operation because of 
unacceptable speeds, and ASTAR error, or for excessive time error. 
Each of the tasks were examined to determine the interfaces needed to support 
them (see Appendix A). From this analysis, it was determined that the IM symbology 
used within the HITL experiment described in Chapter 4 did a good job supporting task 
based behavior. Furthermore, the IM symbology was placed on the appropriate flightdeck 
displays. All of the IM speed information was placed with the IM speed information on 
the PFD, indications of the lead aircraft were placed on the ND, pages for entering 
information into the algorithm on the MCDU, and cautions and advisories on the EICAS 
display. 
There are three time critical actions involved in the IM system: the time it takes 
for the flightcrew to respond to a clearance, the time it takes a flightcrew to match a 
commanded speed and the amount of time an air traffic controller has to recognize and 
impending separation violation and prevent it. To minimally support the task of matching 
the commanded speeds, pilots must have timely indication that a speed change has 
occurred, and indication of any errors. The pilot’s expertise and knowledge of the current 
flight situation is used to determine whether the ASTAR speeds are acceptable or not. To 
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provide timely indication there must be alerting of changes in the commanded speed. In 
the IMSPiDR experiment it appeared that the solid green box that appeared around the 
commanded end speed for ten seconds was not salient enough to adequately capture 
pilots’ attention, and thus the next version of IM displays should have more salient 
notification of speed changes. The IM clearance is long and complicated, since it includes 
the spacing interval, lead aircraft’s callsign, lead aircraft’s route, and the achieve-by 
point. This suggests it is important to streamline the task of providing the initial IM 
clearance as much as possible, which can be accomplished by providing an easy way of 
entering a voice clearance or using a CPDLC clearance. 
It is also possible to look at procedural modifications that could potentially make 
IM run smoother. For instance, under the current procedures the flightcrew is expected to 
terminate the spacing operation if their time error becomes too large. If this occurs later 
in the descent, ATC will probably not have sufficient time to provide the flightcrew with 
a new spacing clearance, and will likely end up having to provide the aircraft with a 
larger spacing buffer and vectors or speed commands to the runway. If the flightcrew is 
able to request an amended spacing interval from ATC, it is possible that they would be 
able to reduce the time error to a manageable value and continue the IM operation to the 
runway. Additionally, there could be cases where the lead aircraft is vectored off path by 
ATC. In the current implementation, this will result in the flight crew of the spacing 
aircraft receiving a “Lead aircraft off path” message, requiring them to cancel the 
operation. This may not be ideal if ATC is only vectoring the lead aircraft temporarily. 
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4.5. Work Domain Analysis (WDA) 
4.5.1. Work Domain Constraints 
The work domain is governed by a number of constraints that the system must 
operate within. Physical constraints describe the constraints imposed by the laws of 
nature. They can include natural forces such as aerodynamics and gravity (energy 
management), the number and size of runways, and aircraft performance, among others. 
Physical constraints can also include the time it takes to complete certain tasks, 
constraints on human or machine memory, and limitations of cognitive abilities.  
Regulatory constraints describe the rules and regulations that have been put into 
place to achieve a safe and organized system. Regulatory constraints can be can be put in 
place so that behavior is predictable, to establish dynamics of teamwork, or to act as more 
conservative forms of physical constraints. There are many regulatory constraints present 
in the NAS to ensure the airspace remains safe and orderly. Some of the rules and 
regulations that are most pertinent to IM include separation constraints, the 250 knot 
speed limit imposed on aircraft below an altitude of 10,000ft, and speed/altitude 
constraints at specific waypoints in a route. Furthermore, there are rules that dictate when 
pilots and air traffic controllers should communicate, the precise phraseology they should 
use, and instances where following ATC instructions is imperative.  
Lastly, automation can be given constraints to help it achieve an ideal behavior. 
For instance, ASTAR contains constraints to limit the number of speed changes and to 
increase the probability that the flightcrew will find the commanded speeds acceptable. 
Some examples of the constraints imposed by ASTAR include limiting the difference 
 91 
between a commanded speed to ±10% of the nominal profile speed, and an “excess 
error” bound.  
4.5.2. Building the Abstraction-Decomposition Space (ADS) 
The work domain was described using the Abstraction-Decomposition Space 
(ADS). Both the abstraction and decomposition dimensions of the ADS were used to 
describe the IM system. The information from the ADS was gathered from the IMSPiDR 
experiment discussed in the previous chapter, and from a variety of sources that were 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
The decomposition dimension of the ADS was split into a system level that 
described the National Air System, a subsystem level that described both Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) and aircraft, and a component level that described IM. This organization 
was chosen because the NAS is primarily comprised of aircraft and ATC infrastructure. 
Each of these subsystems has its own purposes and goals. Furthermore, IM has both a 
component that integrates with ATC and a component that integrates with the flightdeck. 
Thus, IM is a component of both the ATC and flightdeck subsystems. Organizing the 
ADS in this way allows the purposes and functions of the IM system to be compared with 
the purposes and function of both ATC and the flightdeck.  
The abstraction dimension includes the functional purpose, values and priority 
measures, object related functions, and physical objects [23]. To keep the ADS from 
becoming overly complicated, the WDA is often filled out primarily along its diagonal 
(i.e. the purpose related functions are only shown for the system and physical objects are 
only shown for the component). However, in this thesis each decomposition level was 
filled out from top down and the lowest level of abstraction was chosen by the level of 
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detail that was deemed to provide significant benefit to the design process in chapter 5. 
This portrays how ATC and the flightdeck have separate purposes and separate measures 
of success. In the following paragraphs the ADS of the IM system is described, and is 
represented in Table 4.1. 
The functional purpose of the National Airspace System (NAS) is to move people 
and cargo from one point to another safely and efficiently. As the world has become more 
globalized, there is an increasing need to make aviation as accessible as possible, as 
environmentally friendly as possible, and as safe as possible. To accomplish these goals, 
the NAS must operate at the maximum practical efficiency. To help identify the role of 
ATC, the flightdeck, and IM, the functional purposes of the NAS were decomposed into 
the functional purposes of ATC and the flightdeck. ATC is primarily responsible for 
maintaining a safe and efficient air system. This requires maintaining adequate separation 
between aircraft, and efficiently controlling the flow of aircraft. ATC also sees it as their 
duty to promote fairness in the NAS, and will often allow an aircraft a trajectory change 
as long as the request does not interfere with other aircraft in the NAS or safety. Thus, 
ATC has the responsibility of promoting the efficiency and safety of all of the aircraft 
under their control. In contrast, the flightdeck is primarily interested in promoting the 
safety and efficiency of a particular aircraft. The flightdeck’s main customers are 
passengers; thus the goals are safe, comfortable, and low cost flights with minimal 
delays. Lastly, the main purpose of IM is to maximize the runway throughput during 
periods of high demand. This can help enable OPDs during periods when high runway 
throughput is required. OPDs have shown an ability to help reduce noise, air pollution, 
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and fuel use. Additionally, IM has the ability to reduce controller workload by 
minimizing vectoring at low altitudes. 
The values and priority measures in the ADS describe measures that were used to 
determine how well the system is achieving its functional purpose. To achieve the 
functional purposes of moving people/cargo, safety, and efficiency, the NAS must 
minimize the number of collisions/crashes, its environmental impact, and expenses while 
transporting people/cargo. ATC achieves some of these objectives by minimizing losses 
of separation, and maximizing throughput. The flightdeck is concerned with getting their 
passengers to their destination on time using minimal fuel, while maintaining passenger 
comfort. The IMSPiDR experiment demonstrated that passenger comfort was a particular 
concern when pilots were forced to use speedbrakes to achieve their commanded speeds. 
IM can help achieve a number of these values by helping regulate the flow of traffic, 
helping aircraft achieve and/or maintain adequate spacing intervals, and enabling more 
fuel efficient, lower emissions, and lower noise arrivals during busy periods. 
The purpose-related functions were used to describe the general functions that are 
needed to operate the system. The functional purpose of ATC is to manage the air traffic, 
ensure that aircraft maintain adequate separation from each other, and to ensure each 
aircraft is able to get to their destination with minimal delay. To maintain an efficient and 
safe traffic flow, ATC must first understand the current state of the traffic, and be able to 
predict what the state of the traffic will be in the near future. To maximize the efficiency 
of the traffic flow, ATC must make sure that there is a well-conditioned flow of traffic 
arriving to the runway that maintains proper separation intervals and does not contain 
large differences in speeds. To monitor for separation violations, ATC must use their 
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picture of the traffic along with automated decision aids to predict and prevent impending 
separation violations. Lastly, air traffic controllers must communicate with aircraft and 
other controllers to make sure that they have a clear understanding of the traffic, and to 
control the traffic to maintain a safe and efficient traffic flow. Similarly, pilots are often 
told that their purpose related functions are, in priority order starting with the most 
important to aviate (control the aircraft), communicate, navigate, and then manage 
systems. Aviate refers to avoiding obstructions and managing the aircraft’s energy to 
keep it in the air. However, aviating can be expanded to include controlling an aircraft’s 
speed, controlling the aircraft’s path, and monitoring autoflight systems. Navigating 
refers to selecting the aircraft’s path and tactical maneuvers needed to avoid dangerous 
flight conditions such as poor weather. Additionally, aircraft must communicate with 
ATC to determine information about weather conditions, and to receive instructions to 
avoid conflicts with other aircraft. To conduct an IM operation, there are a number of 
additional functions that must be completed by the pilots and controllers. There must be a 
schedule created so spacing intervals can be chosen, eligible aircraft identified, 
information communicated between ATC and the flightdeck, a control mechanism to 
minimize the spacing error, and finally there must be a method of ending the operation. 
The object related functions were used to describe the systems and constraints 
used to meet the purpose-related functions. ATC uses automation in conjunction with 
human expertise to help monitor for separation violations and maintain a smooth arrival 
flow. Monitoring for separation violation necessitates knowing the locations of aircraft 
now and in the near future. ATC gathers the positions of aircraft through radar, and is 
expected to have access to more precise position and velocity data provided by ADS-B. 
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ATC then uses this information to communicate instructions to aircraft to ensure a 
smooth arrival stream. Furthermore, ATC uses STARs to help funnel aircraft into the 
runway. Likewise, modern commercial flightdecks have a number of systems that help 
the flightcrew aviate, navigate, and communicate. These systems include an autopilot, a 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) to help prevent collisions with other aircraft, 
crew alerting systems, communication systems, and navigation systems. Additionally, the 
aircraft itself can be considered an object related function, since its performance 
characteristics can have an impact on the IM operation. Lastly, pilots use published charts 
and procedures, such as STARS and approach plates, to understand the actions they will 
have to do to perform a safe arrival. The IM concept that is discussed in this paper uses 
two major pieces of automation: TMA and ASTAR. TMA generates a runway schedule, 
and ASTAR is in charge of tracking the lead aircraft and controlling the interval between 
the spacing aircraft and the lead aircraft. 
The physical objects category was used to describe the display elements, physical 
locations of the aircraft, and the other physical attributes. The physical objects are only 
described here for equipment that ATC and pilots use for IM. The IM physical objects 
include the IM displays in ATC stations and on the flightdeck, procedures, aircraft 
performance, the locations of the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft to enable a spacing 
algorithm to provide guidance to the aircraft. The weather is also considered a physical 
object of interest, as storms can force aircraft to deviate from their nominal course, or and 
non-forecast winds can cause additional speed changes. 
Lastly, means-end relationships were created to describe the relationships 
between the different elements in the ADS. There are many means-end relationships that 
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can be discussed. This thesis concentrates on those that are deemed the most important. 
The means-end relationships present in the ADS can be generally be described by the 
physics of the trajectory and the speed control law. The physics of following the 
trajectory includes the performance of the aircraft, aerodynamics and the dynamics of the 
sensors used to determine the aircraft’s location with respect to the trajectory, which 
includes latency, update rate, and error. For the purposes of discussion, a subset of the 
entire ADS described in Table 4.1 is portrayed in Figure 4.5: A subset of the ADS with 
means-end relationships. Means-end relationships were drawn between elements of the 
ADS that had dependencies. From this process, it was determined  that many of the 





Table 4.1: The Abstraction-Decomposition Space (ADS) of the IM system 
Decomposition → 
↓ Abstraction 
System Subsystems Component 
National Airspace System Air Traffic Control Aircraft IM 
Functional Purpose Move people and/or cargo from 
point A to point B, Safety, 
Efficiency 
Manage air traffic, Ensure 
separation, Promote fairness 
among aircraft, Minimize delay 
Safe transportation of 
people/cargo, Provide passenger 
comfort, Minimize cost 
Maximize runway throughput during 
periods of high demand 
Values and Priority 
Measures 
Minimize expenses, Minimize 
environmental impact, Minimize 
the number of collisions/crashes, 
Adherence to regulations, Number 
of people moved 
Maximize runway throughput, 
Maximize the efficiency of the 
traffic flow, Minimize separation 
violations 
Aerodynamics and balance of 
forces, Minimize fuel used, 
Maximize passenger comfort, 
Management of physical and 
attention resources 
Maximize arrival precision behind 




 Maintain a picture of the traffic 
situation, Monitor for separation 
violations, Monitor the weather, 
Streamline flow, Handoffs, 
Communicate with aircraft and 
other controllers 
Navigate, Communicate, Control 
speed, Control path, Energy 
management, Manage aircraft’s 
systems, Adhere to ATC 
instructions, Avoid obstructions, 
Avoid weather,  
Runway scheduling, Communication 
and coordination, Trajectory 
generation, Tracking lead aircraft, 




 TMA, Communications systems, 
Radar System, Arrival routes, 
Airport configuration, Weather 
Navigation systems, 
Communication systems, 
Autopilot, Crew alerting system, 
TCAS, Aircraft performance, 
Arrival diagrams (STARS,  
approach plates, etc.) 
ASTAR, TMA/TAPSS, ADS-B 
Physical Objects  CPDLC, Radio MCP speed window, VNAV and 
LNAV buttons, FMS page 
containing the route, ND, PFD, 
MCDU, flaps, landing gear, 
throttle 
Ownship position, Lead aircraft 
position, Ownship 4D trajectory, 
Lead aircraft 4D trajectory, Spacing 
error, Aircraft performance, IM 
clearance, Commanded speeds, 
Radio, Datacom, Procedures and 
checklists, Aircraft flap configuration, 
Runway schedule, IM flightdeck 
displays (Display of lead aircraft, 
Display of commanded speed, 
Display of changes to the, 
commanded speed, Pilot alerting, 
Display of route, Display of weather), 
IM ATC displays (timeline, 
Indication of ATC intervene point, 
Indication of CPDLC equipped 
aircraft, Indication of IM equipped 














































































Figure 4.5: A subset of the ADS with means-end relationships 
 
 
Many of the physical objects discussed in the IM portion of the ADS are 
connected together by the ASTAR speed control algorithm [76], [74]. Furthermore, the 
ASTAR speed control algorithm is described in. The ASTAR speed control algorithm 
begins by using the spacing aircraft’s Time-To-Go (TTG) to the achieve-by point, along 
with the lead aircraft’s TTG and a spacing interval to generate a raw time error. The raw 
time error provides a projection of how far ahead or behind the spacing aircraft will be at 
the achieve-by point. Next a filter artificially decreases the value of the time error when 
the aircraft is far from the runway to prevent unnecessary control actions. A gain is 
applied to the filtered time error to create a raw speed error, which is limited to ±10% of 
the nominal profile speed. Next, this speed error is chunked into five knot increments and 
added to the nominal profile. Thus, the speed control algorithm uses the 4D trajectories of 
the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft, along with the spacing interval, to compute an error. 
A proportional gain is applied to that error and used to produce a speed correction. The 
speed correction is implemented by the flightcrew and the difference between the 
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nominal profile speed and commanded speed causes a change to its ETA, acting as the 
feedback loop. The filter that limits the commanded speed to ±10% of the nominal profile 
speed bounds the reachability of the assigned spacing goal. 
 
Figure 4.6: The ASTAR speed control algorithm [76] 
 
Further insights can be gained by examining the ASTAR control algorithm. For 
instance, there are three major factors that affect the time error: error between forecast 
winds and actual winds, the lead aircraft’s deviation from its nominal profile, and the 
spacing aircraft’s deviations from its nominal profile. These deviations will impact the 
ETA of the spacing aircraft or the lead aircraft causing either an increase or decrease in 
spacing error. Additionally, as the aircraft approache the runway, filtering and gain 
scheduling make the speed changes more sensitive to a given time error. 
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There were also periods where speed changes are inhibited to help the 
commanded speed meet regulations and to make them more acceptable to pilots. In the 
IMSPiDR HITL experiment discussed in the previous chapter there were three conditions 
that could inhibit a speed change, limiting the controllability of the algorithm: the 
commanded speed was inhibited if it would violate the 250 knot speed limit below an 
altitude of 10,000ft, if the deviation of the commanded speed from the nominal profile 
speed would be greater than 10% of the nominal profile speed, and if the speed change 
would cause the commanded speed to increase less than ten seconds prior to a scheduled 
(profile) speed decrease. These limits constrain the controllability of the algorithm and 
can impact whether the assigned spacing goal is reachable.  
4.6. Insights into Design 
From the process of completing the WDA it was found that the higher levels of 
abstraction can be examined to ensure the system has the correct objectives: in this case, 
the functional purpose and values and priority measures of IM align with those of the 
NAS, ATC, and the aircraft indicating that IM has appropriate objectives. The lower 
levels of abstraction can be used to identify important domain constraints and 
relationships. Once these constraints and relationships are identified, EID can be used to 
design interfaces that convey them to the operator using easy to understand 
representations. 
EID principals were applied using the ADS to determine appropriate interfaces. 
The basic idea behind EID is to develop interfaces that serve as an external model of the 
system. The operator can use this external mental model to understand the state of the 
system in relation to its constraints, and how the system will react to a given input. 
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Additionally, the goal of EID is to develop displays that support all three modes of 
human cognition: skill based behavior, rule based behavior, and knowledge based 
behavior. By supporting each of these modes, EID interfaces can help support operators 
during both nominal and off-nominal circumstances. 
The implementation of IM used in the IMSPiDR HITL experiment did a good job 
supporting task based behavior; however, experiment results demonstrated that the 
interfaces and procedures often conveyed an incomplete or inaccurate mental model of 
the how ASTAR works, and may have contributed to increased frustration when speed 
changes were unexpected. The IM displays supported skill based behavior by allowing 
pilots to directly act by referencing the displays. This includes seeing a commanded 
speed change on the PFD and dialing that speed into the MCP window, as well as 
controlling the throttles and speed brakes to track the commanded speed bug during 
accelerations and decelerations. The displays and procedures used in the HITL 
experiment supported rule based behavior by providing the flightcrew with a series of 
EICAS messages when they were required to take a specific action. However, the 
experiment demonstrated that the displays and procedures had difficulty supporting 
knowledge based behavior and conveying an accurate mental model of the system to the 
pilots. The data from the IMSPiDR experiment in chapter 3 showed that some pilots used 
the information available to them to develop a mental model of the relationship between 
the aircraft’s position, the time error on the MCDU, and the speed commands they were 
receiving; however, this information often misled the flightcrew, resulting in an 
incomplete or inaccurate mental model. If the relationship between spacing and lead 
aircraft’s state can be communicated through the interface, it is hypothesized that pilots 
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will gain a greater understanding of why particular speed commands are provided and of 
how their conformance to the commanded speed affects their ability to achieve a precise 
spacing interval behind a lead aircraft.  
The means-end relationships in the WDA show that changes to the time error are 
composed of the spacing aircraft’s deviation from its profile speed, the lead aircraft’s 
deviation from its profile speed, and differences between the actual winds and forecast 
winds. In the previous chapter, pilot comments indicated that they did not have a good 
understanding of the relationship between the time error provided by ASTAR and the 
commanded speed. This relationship can be broken into a few simple rules. 
 As the magnitude of the time error decreases, ASTAR will return the aircraft to 
its nominal profile speed. 
 If the time error is increasing (arriving earlier), the commanded speed will 
increase. 
 If the time error is decreasing (arriving later), the commanded speed will 
decrease. 
 If the time error is positive (arriving early), the commanded speed will be below 
the nominal profile speed. 
 If the time error is negative (arriving late) the commanded speed will be above 
the nominal profile speed. 
Additionally, the cause of changes to the time error can be provided to pilots by 
separating the rate of change of the time error into different components. ASTAR 
calculates the Time-To-Go (TTG) of the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft along their 
respective 4D trajectories and uses this information in conjunction with the spacing 
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interval to generate a time error. Assuming no trajectory recalculations, the rate of change 
of the Time-To-Go for each aircraft can be computed by looking at the difference in the 
profile ground speed and the actual ground speed at the aircraft’s location along the 4D 
trajectory. If the forecast winds and actual winds are known, the rate of change in the 
TTG can be decomposed into a wind component and component that is caused by the 
flightcrew flying off their nominal speed.  
In addition to the relationships between the physical world and the commanded 
speed, there are constraints on ASTAR’s commanded speed as noted earlier. These 
constraints include excess error bounds which are used to determine if the spacing 
interval is reachable, the point where controllers are expected to intervene to prevent a 
separation violation, and the ±10% speed bound that ASTAR uses to limit the 
controllability and ensure commanded speeds remain acceptable. Providing pilots with 
the aircraft state in relation to these constraints, or otherwise illustrating when these 
constraints are limiting the commanded speed, could provide pilots with greater 
situational awareness. 
4.7. The Combination of HTA and WDA 
The previous sections discussed both the results from the HTA, CTA, and WDA. 
In this section, further insights are found by juxtaposing the three models. Initially the 
results of the WDA and HTA were combined by connecting the physical forms required 
to complete each task to the physical forms in the WDA, effectively providing a link 
between the WDA and HTA. However, this was time consuming, and there was little 
insight gained. Instead, the tasks associated with the rules and constraints were 
determined from the WDA. The idea is that providing operators with thorough 
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knowledge of a system can change the way they operate the system, and could change the 
way tasks should be allocated. 
The tasks associated with the rules and constraints derived from the WDA are 
presented in Table 4.2. Most of the rules/constraints are associated with the tasks of 
monitoring for speed changes and updating the commanded speed. The task of updating 
the commanded speed is included because providing the flightcrew with additional 
information might influence whether or not they choose to should follow a new 
commanded speed. The only two constraints that are different are the ‘excessive error’ 
constraint and the controller intervention bound. These two constraints are associated 
with the tasks of terminating the spacing operation and amending a clearance. 
There are two issues that were identified from examining the rules and constraints 
from the WDA and their associated tasks. The first issue is that providing the flightcrew 
with information of the time error and the rate at which it is increasing or decreasing 
could cause the flightcrew to disobey the commanded speed. The second issue was that 
providing pilots with knowledge of the controller intervention point may cause them to 
modify their speeds to avoid it. If they are part of a string of aircraft there is the 
possibility that this could cause stream instabilities. Additionally, the flightcrew could try 
to contact ATC to cancel the spacing operation. If the flightcrew and ATC 
simultaneously see that the aircraft is past the controller intervention point, they may try 
to contact each other at the same time. This could potentially be mitigated with a clear 





Table 4.2: Rules and constraints from the WDA and their associated tasks from the HTA 
Rule or Constraint (From WDA) Associated Task(s) (From HTA) 
If the time error is increasing, the 
commanded speed will increase 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed, Update commanded speed 
If the time error is decreasing, the 
commanded speed will decrease 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed, Update commanded speed 
If the time error is positive, the 
commanded speed will be greater or 
equal to the profile speed 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed, Update commanded speed 
If the time error is negative, the 
commanded speed will be less than or 
equal to the commanded speed 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed, Executing operation 
As the aircraft approaches the runway the 
speed becomes more sensitive to the time 
error 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed, Executing operation 
As the aircraft approaches the runway, 
the notch filter causes less error to be 
ignored 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed, Update commanded speed 
The commanded speed must stay within 
±10% of the profile speed 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed, Update commanded speed 
The time error should stay within the 
‘excess error’ bounds (otherwise cancel 
the operation) 
Terminate the spacing operation, Update 
appended clearance 
The speed must remain below 250 knots 
when the aircraft is below 10,000ft. 
Monitor for changes to the commanded 
speed 
The controller intervention bound (If 
ASTAR is configured to monitor the 
current spacing between the spacing 
aircraft and lead aircraft) 
Terminate Spacing Operation, Update 
appended clearance, Monitor for excess 
spacing bounds 
4.8. Summary 
This chapter developed a WDA, HTA, and CTA of the IM system. The purpose 
of the WDA, HTA, and CTA was to determine procedures and interfaces that could 
enable the flightcrew to fully understand the relationships between the physical world and 
the commanded speeds they are provided. In general, the purpose of the WDA was to 
describe the relationships and constraints that are present in IM, the purpose of the HTA 
was to describe pilots’ nominal behavior, and the purpose of the CTA was to identify the 
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decision making process that could be used when conducting tasks that required a 
decision. 
The WDA used an ADS to describe the entire work domain of IM. The ADS was 
separated into components describing the entire NAS, ATC, the flightdeck, and IM. The 
WDA indicated that there are two major relationships in the IM system: the relationship 
between the physical world and the time error computed by the spacing algorithm, and 
the relationship between the time error and commanded speed changes. The previous 
chapter demonstrated that some pilots tried to determine these relationships using 
available information, but often formed an incomplete or incorrect mental model. Thus, 
there are potential benefits to be gained from providing the flightcrew with interfaces and 
procedures that act as external representations of the system. The WDA showed that that 
the behavior of IM can be broken into a few simple rules and constraints. In the next 
chapter, these rules will be incorporated into proposed interfaces and procedures.  
To link the WDA and HTA together, the rules of operations obtained from the 
WDA were linked with their associated tasks. Some potential problems were identified 
that could result in non-ideal behavior. For instance, providing the flightcrew with more 
information could result in them modifying their commanded speed to decrease their 
error at a faster rate than ASTAR desires. This modification could have a negative impact 
on any aircraft behind them. Additionally, providing the flightcrew with the controller 
intervention point has the potential to cause confusion as to whether it is the flightcrew’s 
job to avoid the constraint or ATC’s job. It is important for the interfaces to the show 
pilots whether the spacing algorithm is working correctly, and procedures that provide a 
clear delegation of responsibility. 
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Lastly, two major control tasks were identified from the HTA: determining 
whether or not to accept an IM clearance, and determining whether to continue the IM 
operation. Information needs, leaps, and shunts for each control task were determined.  
The CTA determined that there is a lot of information that pilots must integrate together 
when determining whether they should continue the spacing operation. 
In the next chapter, the rules and task knowledge that was generated by the WDA, 
HTA, and CTA will be used to design interface representations and procedures. It is 
hypothesized that the proposed interface and procedures additions will help pilots build 
an accurate mental model of the relationships between the physical world and the time 
error, and between the time error and the commanded speed.  
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5.   CHAPTER 5 
INTERFACE AND PROCEDURE MODIFICATIONS 
5.  
5.1. Introduction 
The Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) experiment discussed in Chapter 3 was used to 
complete a Work Domain Analysis (WDA), Control Task Analysis (CTA), and 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) of the Interval Management (IM) system. The WDA 
and HTA both contain complete information of the IM system that conveys different, but 
complementary, information to the operator. The WDA was used to describe the 
constraints imposed on IM, as well as relationships describing how the IM algorithm 
works. The results from the WDA were used to determine rules that the IM automation 
follows to generate speed commands. Furthermore, an HTA was used to describe both 
the normal, and anticipated non-normal events that pilots and air traffic controllers may 
encounter. Within this chapter, the information gathered from the WDA and HTA will be 
used to recommend displays and procedures that have the potential to support pilots 
during both nominal and off-nominal circumstances. 
Insights from the WDA can be used to create representations that convey the 
dynamics of the system to the operator. These can be either external representations 
provided by displays or written procedures, or they can be internal representations that 
are provided through training. The idea behind these representations is to help operators 
develop a thorough understanding of how the spacing algorithm works, and provide the 
operator with the ability to monitor the dynamics of the operation. By understanding why 
a particular speed change is occurring, it is hypothesized that operators will be able to 
identify off-nominal conditions, and determine appropriate plans of action. Furthermore, 
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understanding why the automation is producing specific speed changes could decrease 
pilot frustration and increase acceptability. 
The information from the HTA can be used to describe a nominal course of 
behavior from which procedures can be systematically designed, resulting in increased 
usability of IM. Ideally, the procedures will provide pilots with general rules of thumb 
and guidelines that they can use during both normal and anticipated non-normal events. 
This chapter will describe the creation of representations and procedures for the 
IM system. First, information gained from the WDA will be used to build representations 
that describe the dynamics of the system. Second, information gained from the HTA will 
be used to describe a nominal course of behavior. 
5.2. Using the WDA to Build Representations 
When EID principals were applied to the WDA in the previous chapter, a number 
of pieces of information were identified that could help pilots understand the 
relationships that ASTAR uses to compute a time error and generate a commanded speed. 
From the ASTAR speed control law, it was determined that the rate of change of the time 
error was the best indication of changes in the commanded speed. Furthermore, to help 
pilots understand the relationship between the physical world and the time error 
generated by ASTAR, the rate of change of the time error can be decomposed into the 
rate of change of the time error caused by the spacing aircraft, the lead aircraft, and wind 
error. ASTAR also has a number of constraints designed to generate more acceptable 
speeds. These constraints include limits to the commanded speed, excess error bounds, 
and suppressed speed changes that would violate the 250 knot speed limit below an 
altitude of 10,000ft. 
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In the following sections, IM interfaces will be discussed in terms of skill, rule, 
and knowledge based behavior. Rasmussen stated that there are certain representations 
that are associated with each of these behaviors [13]. Specifically, skill based behavior 
can be associated with signals, rule based behavior with signs, and knowledge based 
behavior with symbols. Signals are considered as time-space variables that humans can 
process as continuous variables, and that humans can act on using automatic skill based 
behavior. Signs are indications that trigger rule based actions a human operator has 
learned, or point the operator to a procedure containing rule based information. Symbols 
are abstract representations that display the relationships and constraints within a system 
and between the system and the environment. Since symbols provide the operator with 
relationships and constraints, they can be useful when there is no rule based information 
or automatic behavior applicable to a situation. 
5.2.1. Supporting Skill Based Behavior 
Skill based behavior is automatic behavior that requires little or no thought, and 
often consists of highly practiced tasks. Skill based behavior can be supported by 
providing operators with information that they can directly act on, enabling them to use 
learned skills immediately.  
IM contains a number of tasks that can be completed using skill based behavior. 
For instance, pilots are asked to achieve new speeds as new commanded speeds are 
issued. This can require using the throttle and/or speedbrake to maintain an appropriate 
speed and stay on their path.  
The displays and interfaces used in the IMSPiDR experiment are well suited to 
supporting skill based behavior. For instance, the IM commanded speed was placed just 
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above the FMS commanded speed, allowing the flightcrew to easily ensure that they 
match. Additionally, a speed bug was placed on the speed tape, providing pilots with an 
additional method of determining whether their aircraft’s speed matched their 
commanded speed. When a new commanded speed was given, pilots were either required 
to monitor the commanded speed to make sure it was acceptable (if they had an 
autothrottle managed mode), or update the FMS speed using the MCP speed window (if 
they did not have an autothrottle managed mode). 
5.2.2. Supporting Rule Based Behavior 
Rule based behavior can be thought of as a series of IF/THEN statements. The 
rules can either be conveyed through the interface, written as procedures, taught through 
training, or learned observing a system during operation. EID states that interfaces should 
provide a one-to-one mapping between the constraints present in the work domain and 
the representations displayed on the interface, meaning that the interface should describe 
the aircraft’s relation to the constraints that were identified in the WDA. 
The IM procedures and interfaces used on the flightdeck have been designed to 
support rule based behavior. Many of these operations can be placed into a series of 
IF/THEN statements. For instance, if a speed change occurs then pilots are expected to 
update their commanded speed; if the commanded speed is not acceptable then pilots are 
required to cancel the IM operation; and if a IM clearance is received the pilots are 
expected to go through the process of accepting or rejecting the clearance. If the 
flightcrew receives a warning or caution, they are required to follow the appropriate 
procedure. The interface, procedures, and automation used in the IMSPiDR experiment 
supported rule based behavior by providing pilots with cues notifying them which 
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procedure to complete. For instance, EICAS messages were used to notify the flightcrew 
when there was a problem and procedures associated with the EICAS messages notified 
them of actions they should take. Furthermore, the process of accepting and rejecting a 
clearance is a rule based process. The pilots are expected to receive the clearance, load it 
into onboard avionics, and then determine if the commanded speed that is generated is 
acceptable at that particular time (i.e. if it within the aircraft’s speed constraints).  
The rules that were not supported by the procedures and interfaces used in the 
IMSPiDR HITL experiment included relationships that described the dynamics of the 
system and rules of thumb for determining if a clearance or commanded speed was 
acceptable. These rules were described in Table 4.2, and can be provided to pilots 
through internal representations (training and memory), or through external 
representations (displays, procedures). In section 5.2.4. , some of the rules described in 
Table 4.2 will be designed into a new trend indicator. These rules include the IM excess 
error bounds, the controller intervention bounds, and rules of thumb regarding how the 
commanded speed reacts to an increase or decrease in the time error. It is hypothesized 
that providing flightcrew with rules of thumb regarding ASTAR’s operation will help 
pilots understand the relationships between the physical world and the commanded 
speeds they are provided.  
5.2.3. Supporting Knowledge Based Behavior 
Knowledge based behavior occurs when there are no skills or rules that are 
applicable to a particular situation. Knowledge based behavior is more effortful than skill 
and rule based behavior, and involves improvisation and experimentation to determine an 
appropriate course of action. Supporting knowledge based behavior also has the potential 
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to help the operator gain a deep understanding of the system. Providing pilots with the 
information needed to understand the speed constraints may help decrease their 
frustration and increase their acceptance of IM operations, particularly when there are 
errors present that cause non-ideal speed changes or frequent speed changes. 
To support knowledge based behavior and a deep understanding of IM, it is 
necessary to convey the constraints and dynamics of the IM operation to the flightcrews 
identified in the WDA.  One way of doing this is to use EID principles to develop 
displays that serve as an external mental model of IM. It is hypothesized that the doing 
this will help the pilots understand why particular speed changes were given and 
encourage correct conformance.  
5.2.4. Proposed Display Features 
Within this section, the focus is placed on developing EID displays that can fit 
into the current flightdeck, as well as EID displays that could be used if the displays were 
not constrained to a current flightdeck.  
Several papers have proposed different trend indicators to help determine how 
well the spacing operation is proceeding (Figure 5.1). Many of these trend indicators 
were developed for algorithms other than ASTAR and thus may have different 
underlying logic. Nevertheless, it is useful to examine previous work that has been 
completed. NLR developed a trend indicator that included the spacing error and the rate 
of change of the spacing error [78]. CoSpace developed a trend indicator for their 
particular spacing algorithm that showed the spacing error, rate of change of the spacing 
error, and constraints imposed on the spacing error [49]; the CoSpace trend indicator 
received high acceptability ratings from pilots. A usability study conducted at NASA 
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Langley investigated two trend indicators designed to support the IM interface. The 
bounds of these two trend indicators showed the time error relative to ASTAR’s “excess 
error” bounds [64]. The intent of the trend indicator was to help pilots understand the 
dynamics of the operation, and why they are being told to fly a particular speed. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Spacing trend indicators from the literature (from left to right), (a) A spacing trend 
indicator developed by NLR [78], (b) A spacing trend indicator developed by CoSpace [49], (c) A 
spacing trend indicator developed at NASA Langley for ASTAR [64], (d) A second representation of 
the trend indicator developed at NASA Langley [64]  
 
Figure 5.2 shows the process that was used to create a new trend indicator that has 
the potential to convey the relationship between the time error and commanded speeds, 
and a number of constraints used by the spacing algorithm. The elements of the trend 
indicator were derived from the constraints and relationships identified using the WDA, 
and spacing trend indicator examined by Volk was used as a starting point (Figure 2.1, d) 
[64]. From this basis and the WDA, the following display features were identified: 
a) A trend indicator showing the “excess spacing” bounds was used as a starting 
point for the new trend indicator. The black caret depicts the time error, and the 
ends of the indicator depict the excess error bounds. When the caret moves to the 
top or bottom of the of the trend indicator it indicated that the assigned spacing 
interval at the designated achieve-by point was not reachable. 
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b) Indication of the time error at which a controller would intervene are shown by 
displaying the constraint and graying out the other portion of the trend indicator. 
If this feature is used, it will be necessary for ATC and the flightdeck to share the 
same constraints (i.e. they could be standardized). The discussion of the joint 
HTA and WDA model also identifies that the procedures would have to clearly 
identify responsibilities if the time error moved beyond this threshold. For 
example, while the flightcrew is waiting for ATC to contact them, can they 
modify their speed to avoid this bound? 
c) Two green lines were added to indicate the time error needed to cause a speed 
change. If the time error moved past the upper or lower green line a speed change 
would occur. Additionally, the green lines will move closer together as the 
aircraft approaches the runway showing the pilot the increase in the proportional 
gain. 
d) The green speed change indicators can be grayed to show instances where 
commanded speed changes are suppressed, such as when the aircraft is below 
10,000ft and subject to a 250 knot speed limit or when the commanded speed’s 
deviation from the nominal profile speed is greater than ±10% of the profile 
speed. In addition to graying the speed change indicators, a message could be 
provided to pilots notifying them why a particular speed change was suppressed. 
e) A green arrow was added to depict the rate of change of the interval error 
between the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft to provide additional predictability, 
or feed forward knowledge of the system to pilots. The arrow would change its 
length based on the magnitude of the rate of change of the time error. It is also 
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possible to give the length of the arrow a physical meaning, such as having it 
indicate the projected time error after 30 seconds if the same rate of change was 
maintained. Pilots could use this feature in conjunction with the green speed 
change indicators to determine feed-forward knowledge of the system: for 
instance, whether they were likely to receive a non-scheduled speed increase or 
speed decrease in the near future. 
f) An outlined green bar was added to depict the notch filter that ASTAR uses to 
decrease the number of speed changes when the aircraft is far from the runway. 
The notch filter subtracts a certain amount of error from the unfiltered time error. 
For instance, if the spacing aircraft’s raw time error was 20 seconds, and the filter 
value was 15 seconds, the filtered time error would be 5 seconds. If the raw time 
error was less than 15 seconds, the filtered time error will be zero. The notch 
filter value decreases as the aircraft approaches the runway. The depiction of the 
notch filter can help pilots better understand why ASTAR does not completely 
null their time error when they are far from the runway. Furthermore, as long as 
the time error is within the green bar, the commanded speed will be the same as 




Figure 5.2: Trend indicator developed by EID to help pilots build an accurate mental model of the 
ASTAR algorithm and to help the pilots understand why they were receiving particular speed 
changes 
 
One of the challenges of creating the trend indicator shown in Figure 5.2 is that 
ASTAR does not generate or use the rate of change of the time error. The rate of change 
of the time error can be computed in one of two ways: the time error can be numerically 
differentiated, or the rate of change of the time error can be determined by examining the 
difference between the nominal ground speed and the actual ground speed. Numerical 
differentiation often amplifies noise, and filters intended to decrease the noise, such as 
the Savitzky–Golay smoothing filter, can cause a time delay; thus, the desired approach is 
to determine the rate of change of the time error using the difference between the nominal 
ground speed and actual ground speed. This approach can also be used to separate the 
rate of change of the time error into components of spacing aircraft performance, lead 
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are shown in Appendix A. However, ASTAR periodically re-computes the trajectory due 
to updates to its wind model. When a trajectory update is completed, there can be a 
discrete jump in the time error, which causes the rate of change of the time error to 
become a large value for a short period of time. The effects of the trajectory regenerations 
are discussed in greater detail in Appendix B. Despite efforts of smoothing the 
discontinuities out using a first order low pass filter, moving average, and Savitzky–
Golay smoothing filter, the jump discontinuities caused by trajectory regenerations 
caused undesirable display behavior. If a trend indicator similar to the one depicted in 
Figure 5.1 is used in the future, the ASTAR algorithm may need to be modified so that 
trajectory regenerations do not cause discontinuities in the time error. 
The final spacing trend indicator (Figure 5.2, h) contains both rule and knowledge 
based information, and minimizes the need for internal representations. The rule based 
information shows the pilots their relationship to the excess error constraint and the 
controller intervention bound (if this feature is used), and notifies them when a speed 
change is suppressed. Furthermore, the trend indicator has various features that show the 
flightcrew the dynamics of the system. For instance, an arrow indicating the rate of 
change of the time error was added so that pilots can determine whether error was 
moving toward a speed increase or a speed decrease. Additionally, indication of the time 
error needed for a change in the commanded speed was added. With this indication, along 
with the arrow depicting the rate of change of the time error, pilots can predict a speed 
increase or decrease. Lastly, the notch filter value is shown and the gain scheduling is 
shown by the distance between the speed change indicators (the green lines), allowing 
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pilots to see that the spacing algorithm becomes more sensitive to a given time error as 
the aircraft approaches the runway.  
The previously discussed trend indicator was created using the requirement that it 
can be incorporated into current day flightdecks. There may be ways of better 
representing the system in future flightdecks. For instance, the spacing trend could be 
placed on a plot of the nominal profile speed to show pilots where scheduled profile 
speed decreases occur and to show them that the commanded speeds are simply 
deviations from the nominal profile. Additionally, a trend indicator could use depictions 
of aircraft moving closer to or farther from each other to indicate changes to the spacing 
interval. Since the work in this thesis is focused on a nearer term interface, these ideas are 
not investigated further. 
5.3. Using the HTA to Determine Nominal Course of Behavior 
The HTA developed in the previous chapter can be used to determine procedures 
for the IM operations. The procedures described below have many similarities to those 
described by RTCA in DO-328 [4]. The place where the procedures diverge from those 
that were previously described is the addition of a “nominal behavior” section that 
describes the behavior of ASTAR. The sections below describe the IM procedures that 
have been proposed as well as additions to the procedures. 
5.3.1. Initialize IM Operation 
IM initializes when ATC provides a clearance to the flightcrew. The method used 
to input the clearance into the system is not considered, as it will depend on the whether 
the clearance is provided by CPDLC or voice, as well as the equipage of the aircraft. 
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1. Review clearance (confirm the clearance is acceptable) 
2. Input clearance parameters  
3. Activate ASTAR, producing an initial commanded speed 
4. Determine if the aircraft is capable of flying the initial commanded speed 
a. If the aircraft is able to fly the commanded speed is acceptable to the 
flightcrew, execute the IM operation 
b. If the aircraft is not able to match the commanded speed, reject the 
clearance and follow ATC directions 
5.3.2. Conduct IM Operation 
1. Monitor IM displays for speed changes and errors 
2. If the aircraft transitions from RTA control to IM, notify ATC 
3. If a speed change occurs match the new commanded speed 
5.3.3. Amend Clearance 
1. Review clearance amendment (confirm the clearance is acceptable) 
2. Change amended parameters  
3. Activate ASTAR, producing an initial commanded speed 
4. Determine if the aircraft is capable of flying the initial commanded speed 
a. If the aircraft is able to fly the commanded speed is acceptable to the 
flightcrew, execute the IM operation 
b. If the aircraft is not able to match the commanded speed, reject the 
clearance and follow ATC directions 
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5.3.4. Suspend Clearance 
1. If ATC instructs flightcrew to suspends clearance, suspend IM operations (should 
remove speed guidance) 
2. Follow ATC instructions 
3. If ATC instructs flightcrew to resume IM, they should resume IM speed guidance 
5.3.5. Terminate Clearance 
1. If the commanded speed is no longer acceptable, there is an ASTAR error and the 
time error exceeds the excess spacing bound 
a. Notify ATC that the operation is being terminated 
b. Fly the previous commanded speed until further instructions are received 
from ATC 
c. Follow ATC instructions 
2. If ATC tells the flightcrew to terminate the spacing operation 
a. Follow ATC instructions 
5.3.6. Nominal IM Behavior 
In addition to the procedures from the HTA, rules from the WDA can be added to 
the procedures to notify the flightcrew what behavior to expect from ASTAR. This is a 
portion of the procedures that this thesis contributes to procedures proposed by the 
RTCA. 
Speed change behavior: 
1. If the time error is increasing, expect the commanded speed to increase 
2. If the time error is decreasing, expect the commanded speed to decrease 
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3. If the time error is positive (arriving early), expect the commanded speed to be 
lower than the nominal profile speed 
4. If the time error is negative (arriving late), expect the commanded speed to be 
higher than the nominal profile speed 
 
ASTAR constraints 
1. IM will provide speed commanded speeds no more that ±10% of the nominal 
profile speed from the nominal profile speed 
2. As the aircraft approaches the runways, speed changes will become more 
sensitive to a given time error 
5.4. Summary 
This chapter discussed how the rules and constraints developed from the WDA 
and CTA can be turned into representations that show the dynamics of the system, and 









Interval Management (IM) has the potential to help increase runway throughput 
and enable aircraft to fly fuel efficient Optimized Profile Descents (OPDs) by allowing 
an aircraft to achieve a precise interval behind a lead aircraft. Numerous studies have 
shown that IM is able to provide its expected benefit in a varsity of circumstances. One 
implementation of IM that is being investigated at NASA Langley Research Center uses 
both a ground scheduling system operated by Air Traffic Control (ATC) and flightdeck 
avionics to provide speeds to the flightcrew to achieve a spacing interval that is 
designated by ATC.  
A Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) experiment was conducted at NASA Langley 
with the purpose of investigating the use of IM to dependent parallel runways. This 
particular experiment only concentrated on the flightdeck portion of IM, and examined 
two control methods (RTA and IM) and three error sources (no error, offset error, and 
wind error). The results of the experiment determined that, overall, pilots found the 
spacing operation acceptable. However, there were cases where the large error sources 
caused less than acceptable behavior, which included too many speed changes within a 
short period of time, speed changes that forced pilots to reconfigure their flaps, and speed 
increases that occurred when pilots thought they should be decreasing their speed for 
landing. Furthermore, pilot comments indicated that pilots had an incorrect or incomplete 
understanding of how IM works. It is hypothesized that providing pilots with displays 
and procedures that act as an external mental model of IM will provide pilots with the 
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information needed to better understand the relationships between the physical world and 
the commanded speeds. Thus, the objective of this thesis was to perform an HTA, CTA, 
and WDA to evaluate the procedures and interfaces that are being proposed for IM, and 
to use their insights to design interfaces and procedures.  
Previous research has shown that HTA, CTA, and WDA can be used to design 
systems that support the operator. Furthermore, research has shown that these two 
methods can provide complementary information. Task analysis is the study of the tasks 
operators are expected to carry out, and is good at deriving training regimens, procedures, 
and interfaces that support task completion. Thus, task based interfaces often have high 
usability in nominal conditions. However, task based interfaces are limited to supporting 
behavior in anticipated circumstances. WDA uses knowledge of the constraints and 
dynamics of the work domain. Since WDA models the environment instead of particular 
tasks, it has been suggested that it can be used to develop interfaces that support operators 
during unanticipated circumstances. WDA can also provide operators with a deep and 
accurate knowledge of the system, resulting in increased understanding of changes to the 
system state caused by automation.                                                                                
The information learned from the HITL was used to create a WDA, HTA, and 
CTA, which were used to examine IM from a systems perspective. The WDA was used 
to develop rules and constraints explaining the dynamics of the IM operation. The rules 
that were developed indicated that the rate of change of the time error could be used to 
determine whether the commanded speed would be increasing or decreasing. 
Furthermore, a number of constraints present in the IM system were identified. 
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An HTA was used to determine tasks that were required communication between 
ATC and the flightdeck, as well as tasks that required decision making. A CTA was used 
to describe the decision making process the flightcrew could take when determining 
whether or not the IM clearance and the IM commanded speeds are acceptable. Lastly, 
the rules that describe how ASTAR operates were associated with their corresponding 
tasks. Hypotheses were formed regarding how tasks affected the rules and constraints 
they were associated with, and conversely how the rules and constraints affected the 
tasks. Two potential interactions were discovered. First, there is a possibility that 
providing deep knowledge of the dynamics of the operation will cause pilots to skip some 
speed changes (such as a speed increase at an inopportune time). Secondly, there is the 
possibility that providing the flightcrew with the controller intervention point could cause 
undesirable behavior: pilots may either try to modify their speed away from the 
commanded speeds to avoid the conflict, or the flightcrew could attempt to contact ATC 
to cancel the operation just as ATC was trying to contact them. 
The information from the WDA, HTA, and CTA was used to develop 
representations that have the potential to help the flightcrew obtain a more accurate 
mental model of how ASTAR works. It is hypothesized that supporting an accurate 
mental model could decrease frustration and increase the acceptability of the IM 
operation when less desirable speeds are commanded (such as the wind error and offset 
error used in the IMSPiDR experiment). The representations were created according to 
EID principals. Thus, the discussion was split into supporting skill, rule, and knowledge 
based behavior. It was determined that the displays used in IMSPiDR did a good job 
supporting skill and based behavior and most rule based behavior. However, there were 
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rules of thumb regarding how the algorithm worked that were not supported by the 
IMSPiDR interfaces. Additionally, it was determined that the displays used in the 
IMSPiDR experiment did not support knowledge based behavior very well. Therefore, 
the rules, constraints, and dynamics of IM as derived from the WDA, were incorporated 
into a proposed trend indicator, and the procedures were examined relative to the HTA.  
6.2. Contributions 
The contributions from this thesis can be separated into contributions to the 
development of IM, and contributions to the combined use of HTA, CTA, and WDA to 
develop flightdeck displays and procedures.  
The broad contribution of this thesis is the joint use of WDA, HTA, and CTA to 
examine procedures and interfaces for safety critical systems. This thesis demonstrated 
how a WDA can be used to understand the dynamics and constraints of a system. The 
dynamics and constraints can then be used to develop rules, which can be used to develop 
interfaces that provide users with a thorough understanding of the system. Furthermore, 
the rules that explain the dynamics and constraints of the system can be incorporated into 
the procedures to provide users with a secondary source of information on the system. An 
HTA can be used to define a nominal set of procedures, or a plan, that can be used to give 
a system structure; a CTA can be used to look at tasks that require a decision, and 
determine the information that the operator needs. This approach to designing interfaces 
and procedures is a deviation from the task based approach that is often used in aviation, 
and has the potential to provide pilots with a deeper understanding of the system without 
substantially increasing their cognitive load. 
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This thesis also provided new display and procedure ideas for the IM concept 
being developed at NASA Langley Research Center. The results of this thesis determined 
that the current flightdeck displays do not provide pilots with a deep understanding of 
how the IM automation works, and the pilots had difficulty predicting trends in the 
commanded speeds provided by the automation. By using an ecological design 
philosophy, important relationships and constraints were identified, and representations 
were developed to convey this information to pilots. While the results presented in this 
thesis are specific to the implementation of IM being developed at NASA, the philosophy 
and methodology of the interface design can be extended to other IM algorithms, and to 
many other aviation operations. 
6.3. Further Research 
Future research is needed to better understand the impact of EID displays in the 
flightdeck. Currently, many flightdeck displays are task based, with the emphasis placed 
on actions the flightcrew must accomplish. Furthermore, as the budgets of the major 
airlines continue to be restricted, fewer resources are allocated to training. At the same 
time, automation on the flightdeck continues to increase and become more complex. EID 
interfaces have the potential to provide pilots with fundamental understanding of 
automation on the flightdeck, allowing the flightcrew to gain a deep understanding of the 
system with minimal training. However, implementing EID interfaces requires a 
fundamental change in the way designers approach flightdeck design, and there is the 
potential that there could be unforeseen consequences.  
For IM, further tests are needed to determine if the proposed interfaces will be a 
benefit to pilots. Within this thesis it was hypothesized that that the proposed interfaces 
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would decrease pilot frustration and interruptions caused by IM by enabling better 
understanding of why speed changes were provided. The largest benefit is expected to 





7.   Flightdeck Tasks and Associated Displays 
 
 
Within this section, the flightdeck tasks that were determined in Chapter 5 are 
listed in Table A.1 along with the displays that are needed achieve each task. 
Furthermore, a checkmark was placed in the final column in Table A.1 if the interfaces 
that were listed were present in the Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) experiment that was 
described in Chapter 3. With the exception of the suspend function that was not used in 
the HITL experiment, all of the task based IM displays were present. 
Table A.1: Flightdeck tasks and associated displays 
Task Task Description Displays Needed for Task In HITL 
Interface 
1.1.1.  Receive clearance - Voice communications or 
CPDLC 
 
1.1.2.  Review clearance - Clearance text (if given by 
CPDLC) or voice 
communication 
 
1.1.3.  Input clearance parameters - Method of loading clearance 
information into onboard 
automation 
 
1.2.1.  Activate ASTAR - Activate button  
1.2.2. Compute cmd. speed - Automation  
1.3.1. Determine clearance parameters 
are acceptable 
- Clearance text   
1.3.2. Determine if initial speed is 
acceptable 
- Initial commanded speed 
- Aircraft speed constraints 
- Flap speed limits 





1.4. Accept clearance and execute 
ASTAR 
- Method of sending accept 
message to ATC 




1.5. Reject clearance - Method of sending reject 
message to ATC 
- Method of clearing IM 






Table A.1: Flightdeck tasks and associated displays (Continued) 
2.2.1. Monitor for cmd. speed changes - Indication of a new 
commanded speed 
 
2.1.2. Monitor for IM errors - Indications that aircraft are 
not flying their expected 
profile 
- Indication that the spacing 
goal in the IM clearance is 
not reachable 









2.1.2. Ensure commanded speed remains 
acceptable 
- Commanded speed 
- Aircraft speed constraints 
- Flap speed limits 





2.2. Notify ATC that AC is IM spacing - Indication of when aircraft is 
spacing off its lead aircraft 
 
2.3. Update speed to match new cmd. 
speed 
- Method of inputting 
commanded speed into 
aircraft or automation 
 













2.5.2. Input amended parameters - Method of loading clearance 




2.5.3. Determine if new parameters are 
reasonable 
- Initial commanded speed 
- Aircraft speed constraints 
- Flap speed limits 





2.5.4. Is the new cmd. Speed acceptable - Commanded speed 
- Aircraft speed constraints 
 
 
2.5.5. Accept and execute amendment - Execute button  
2.6.1. Receive clearance suspension - Voice communications 
- Suspend button (that 
removes IM symbology from 
displays) 
 
2.6.2. Stop flying IM profile - Aircraft controls  
2.6.3. Follow ATC commands - ATC commands via voice 
clearance or CPDLC 
 
2.6.4. Resume IM operation - Button that resumes IM 
(should place IM symbology 




Table A.1: Flightdeck tasks and associated displays (Continued) 
3.1. Automatic termination - Automation must know 
aircraft has reached achieve-
by point 
 
3.2.1. Notify ATC of termination  - Voice or CPDLC 
communications with ATC 
 
3.2.2. Fly previous commanded speed - Indication of previous 
commanded speed 
 
3.2.3. Follow ATC instructions - ATC instructions via 







8.   Designing the Spacing Trend Indicator 
 
 In Chapter 5, a trend indicator was described that has the potential to help flight 
crews better understand the commanded speeds generated by ASTAR. This appendix 
discusses some of the challenges with implementing the trend indicator. 
The trend indicator discussed in Chapter 5 contained the rate of change of the 
time error. Since ASTAR calculates the time error based on estimates of the Time-To-Go 
(TTG) to the achieve-by point for both the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft, it does not 
produce a value indicating the rate of change of the time error. Thus, it must it calculated. 
One way of calculating the rate of change of the time error is to take a numerical 
derivative of the actual time error. A common method of taking the numerical derivative 
of a noisy signal is to use a Savitzky-Golay smoothing filter, which performs local 
polynomial regression to both smooth data and determine the derivative. Another 
approach is to use both the spacing and lead aircrafts’ deviations from their predicted 
ground speed. If both the spacing aircraft and lead aircraft begin the spacing operation 
with zero time error and maintain their predicted ground speeds throughout the entire 
flight, they will arrive at the runway with zero time error. If either of the aircraft deviates 
from their predicted groundspeed, their time error will change. Deviations from the 
predicted ground speed can be caused by a wind error, a commanded speed change 
(designed to decrease the time error), or a pilot who is not following the speeds 
commanded by ASTAR.  
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The following equations can be used to determine the rate of change of the time 
error. Equation 1 provides rate of change of the timer error of the spacing aircraft using 
the Distance-To-Go (DTG) of the spacing aircraft, as well as the Ground Speed (GS) of 
the spacing and its predicted GS. Equation 2 describes the rate of change of the time error 
caused by the lead aircraft using its DTG, GS, and profile GS.  
 
       
                 
            
 
                 





       
                 
            
 
                 





                     
 
(3) 
Next, these equations were used to compute the rate of change of the time error, 
using data from the IMSPiDR experiment. Using this method creates smooth signals for 
the rate of change of the time error. However, when the rate of change of the time error 
was integrated, it did not align with the actual unfiltered time error produced by ASTAR. 
This occurred because the actual unfiltered time error contains discontinuities caused by 
ASTAR trajectory updates. These discontinuities are not captured in the equations listed 
above, and cause a discrepancy between the actual unfiltered time error and the time error 
found by integrating the rate of change of the time error that was calculated. 
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Figure B.1: Time error and rate of change of the time error when trajectory updates were not 
included 
 
Figure B.2:Time error and rate of change of the time error when trajectory updates were included 
 
 
 Including the discontinuities caused by trajectory updates helped align the 
unfiltered time error with the value determined by integrating the rate of change of the 
error. However, the rate of change of the time error was not a smooth continuous signal, 
which causes problems when trying to drive a continuous display. Various filtering and 
averaging techniques were implemented in an attempt to lessen the impact of the 
discontinuities, including: a Savitzky-Golay smoothing filter, and a low pass filter. These 
methods did not reduce the discontinuities sufficiently, provided too much time delay, or 
smoothed the actual signal too much.  
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If there is a desire to implement this trend indicator, ASTAR may need a method 








[1]  K. J. Vicente, Cognitive work analysis: Toward safe, productive, and healthy 
computer-based work. Lawrence Erlbaum, 1999. 
[2]  A. Shepherd, Hierarchical task analysis. CRC, 2001. 
[3]  C. A. Miller and K. J. Vicente, “Task Versus Work Domain Analysis Techniques: 
A Comparative Analysis,” in Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
Meeting Proceedings, 1999, vol. 43, pp. 328–332. 
[4]  RTCA, “Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for 
Airborne Spacing-Flight Deck Interval Management (ASPA-FIM),” RTCA Inc., 
Washington D.C., RTCA DO-328, Jun. 2011. 
[5] “Air Traffic Management (ATM) Technology Demonstration - 1 (ATD-1): Interval 
Management - Terminal Area Precision Scheduling and Spacing (IM-TAPSS),” 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, FS-2011-10-01-ARC. 
[6]  B. Kirwan and L. K. Ainsworth, Guide To Task Analysis: The Task Analysis 
Working Group. CRC Press, 1992. 
[7]  J. Annett and N. Stanton, Task Analysis. CRC Press, 2000. 
[8]  P. M. Salmon, G. H. Walker, C. Baber, D. P. Jenkins, and N. A. Stanton, Human 
Factors Methods: A Practical Guide for Engineering And Design, Illustrated edition. 
Ashgate Pub Co, 2006. 
[9]  B. K. Sperling, “Information distribution in complex systems to improve team 
performance,” Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005. 
[10]  J. R. Hajdukiewicz and K. J. Vicente, “A theoretical note on the relationship 
between work domain analysis and task analysis,” Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics 
Science, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 527–538, 2004. 
[11]  P. Salmon, D. Jenkins, N. Stanton, and G. Walker, “Hierarchical task analysis vs. 
cognitive work analysis: comparison of theory, methodology and contribution to 
system design,” Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, vol. 11, no. 6, 2010. 
[12]  J. Annett and K. D. Duncan, “Task analysis and training design,” 1967. 
[13]  J. Rasmussen, “Skills, rules, and knowledge; signals, signs, and symbols, and other 
distinctions in human performance models.,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, 
and Cybernetics, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 257–266, 1983. 
 137 
[14]  J. Keller, K. Leiden, R. Small, A. Goodman, and B. Hooey, “Cognitive task 
analysis of commercial jet aircraft pilots during instrument approaches for baseline 
and synthetic vision displays,” in NASA Aviation Safety Program Conference on 
Human Performance Modeling of Approach and Landing with Augmented 
Displays, 2003, p. 15. 
[15]  X. Jiang, R. Master, K. Kelkar, and A. Gramopadhye, “Task Analysis of Shift 
Change Activity in Aviation Maintenance Environment: Methods and Findings,” 
Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002. 
[16]  C. G. Drury, P. Prabhu, and A. Gramopadhye, “Task analysis of aircraft inspection 
activities: methods and findings,” in Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 1990, vol. 34, pp. 1181–1185. 
[17]  J. Rasmussen, A. M. Pejtersen, and L. P. Goodstein, Cognitive Systems 
Engineering, 1st ed. Wiley-Interscience, 1994. 
[18]  U. Ahlstrom, “Work domain analysis for air traffic controller weather displays,” 
Journal of Safety Research, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 159–169, 2005. 
[19]  N. Naikar, A. Moylan, and B. Pearce, “Analysing activity in complex systems with 
cognitive work analysis: concepts, guidelines and case study for control task 
analysis,” Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 371, 2006. 
[20]  P. Sanderson, N. Naikar, G. Lintern, and S. Goss, “Use of cognitive work analysis 
across the system life cycle: From requirements to decommissioning,” in 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 1999, 
vol. 43, pp. 318–322. 
[21]  D. Jenkins, N. Stanton, G. Walker, P. Salmon, and M. Young, “Creating 
interoperability betweenthe Hierarchical Task Analysis andthe Cognitive Work 
Analysis Tools,” Human Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre, 
HFIDTC/WP2.3.4/2, HFIDTC/WP2.3.4/2, 2006. 
[22]  J. Rasmussen, “The role of hierarchical knowledge representation in 
decisionmaking and system management.,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, & 
Cybernetics, 1985. 
[23]  N. Naikar, R. Hopcroft, and A. Moylan, “Work domain analysis: Theoretical 
concepts and methodology,” Australian Government, Dept. Defence/Defence Sci. 
Technol. Organization, Victoria, Australia, Rep. DSTO-TR-1665, 2005. 
[24]  J. Rasmussen and L. P. Goodstein, Decision support in supervisory control. DK-
4000 Roskilde, Denmark: Risø National Laboratory, 1985. 
[25]  J. Rasmussen, “Outlines of a hybrid model of the process plant operator,” 
Monitoring behavior and supervisory control, pp. 371–383, 1976. 
 138 
[26]  K. J. Vicente and J. Rasmussen, “Ecological interface design: Theoretical 
foundations,” Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 22, no. 4, 
pp. 589–606, 1992. 
[27]  J. Zhang and D. A. Norman, “Representations in distributed cognitive tasks,” 
Cognitive science, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 87–122, 1994. 
[28]  J. Zhang, “Distributed representation as a principle for the analysis of cockpit 
information displays,” The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, vol. 7, no. 
2, pp. 105–121, 1997. 
[29]  S. B. . Van Dam, M. Mulder, and M. M. Van Paassen, “Ecological interface design 
of a tactical airborne separation assistance tool,” Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 
Part A: Systems and Humans, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 1221–1233, 
2008. 
[30]  D. Ho and C. M. Burns, “Ecological interface design in aviation domains: work 
domain analysis of automated collision detection and avoidance,” in Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings, 2003, vol. 47, pp. 119–123. 
[31]  C. Borst, “Ecological Approach to Pilot Terrain Awareness,” Dissertation, ISBN: 
9789053351963, TU Delft, Delft, Netherlands, 2009. 
[32]  M. H. . Amelink, M. M. van Paassen, M. Mulder, and J. M. Flach, “Applying the 
abstraction hierarchy to the aircraft manual control task,” in Proceedings of the 12th 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 2003, pp. 42–47. 
[33]  N. Dinadis and K. J. Vicente, “Designing functional visualizations for aircraft 
systems status displays,” International Journal of Aviation Psychology, vol. 9, no. 3, 
pp. 241–269, 1999. 
[34]  N. Naikar and P. M. Sanderson, “Work domain analysis for training-system 
definition and acquisition,” International Journal of Aviation Psychology, vol. 9, no. 
3, pp. 271–290, 1999. 
[35]  C. A. Miller and K. J. Vicente, “Toward an integration of task-and work domain 
analysis techniques for human-computer interface design,” in Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings, 1998, vol. 42, pp. 336–340. 
[36]  C. A. Miller and K. J. Vicente, “Comparison of display requirements generated via 
hierarchical task and abstraction-decomposition space analysis techniques,” 
International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 335–355, 2001. 
[37]  G. A. Jamieson, “Empirical evaluation of an industrial application of ecological 
interface design,” in Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 
Proceedings, 2002, vol. 46, pp. 536–540. 
 139 
[38]  C. M. Burns et al., “Evaluation of ecological interface design for nuclear process 
control: situation awareness effects,” Human Factors: The Journal of the Human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society, vol. 50, no. 4, p. 663, 2008. 
[39] “FAA Aerospace Forecast Fiscal Years 2010-2030,” p. 2010. 
[40]  Federal Air Administration, “FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan,” Mar. 2011. 
[41]  FAA and Eurocontrol, “Action Plan 1 FAA/Eurocontrol Cooperative R&D 
Principles of Operation for the Use of Airborne Separation Assurance Systems,” 
7.1, Jun. 2001. 
[42]  R. S. Bone and W. J. Penhallegon, “En-route flight deck-based merging and 
spacing impact on flight crew operations,” in Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 
2007. DASC  ’07. IEEE/AIAA 26th, 2007, pp. 3.A.4-1-3.A.4-12. 
[43]  R. Bone, W. J. Penhallegon, and P. Stassen, “Flight Deck-Based Merging and 
Spacing during Continuous Descent Arrivals and Approach: Impact on Pilots. 
MITRE, 2008.,” MITRE, 2008. 
[44]  B. Baxley, B. Barmore, T. Abbott, and W. Capron, “Operational Concept for Flight 
Crews to Participate in Merging and Spacing of Aircraft,” in 6th AIAA Aviation 
Technology, Integration and Operations Conference (ATIO), 25-27 Sep. 2006, 
Wichita, KS, United States, vol. AIAA 2006-7722. 
[45]  L. Credeur, “Basic analysis of terminal operation benefits resulting from reduced 
vortex separation minima,” NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, Tech. Rep, 
1977. 
[46]  C. Hebraud, E. Hoffman, A. Papin, N. Pene, L. Rognin, and C. Sheehan, “CoSpace 
2002 light Deck Experiments Assessing The Impact of Spacing Instructions from 
Cruise to Initial Approach:Volume I,” EEC Report No. 388 – Volume I, Feb. 2004. 
[47]  E. Hoffman, N. Pene, L. Rognin, and K. Zeghal, “Introducing a new spacing 
instruction. Impact of spacing tolerance on flight crew activity,” in Human Factors 
and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings, 2003, vol. 47, pp. 174–178. 
[48]  C. Hébraud, E. Hoffman, N. Pène, L. Rognin, and K. Zeghal, “Assessing the impact 
of a new air traffic control instruction on flight crew activity,” Human performance, 
situation awareness and automation: current research and trends: HPSAA II, p. 133, 
2004. 
[49]  E. Hoffman, P. Martin, T. Putz, A. Trzmiel, and K. Zeghal, “Airborne spacing: 
Flight deck view of compatibility with continuous descent approach (CDA),” in In 
Proceedings of the 7th  AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration and Operations 
Conference.  September 18-20, Belfast, Northern Ireland., 2007. 
 140 
[50]  I. Grimaud, E. Hoffman, L. Rognin, and K. Zeghal, “Spacing instructions in 
approach: Benefits and limits from an air traffic controller perspective,” in 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Guidance, Navigation 
and Control Conference, 2004. 
[51]  I. Grimaud, E. Hoffman, L. Rognin, and K. Zeghal, “Spacing instructions in 
approach: Benefits and limits from an air traffic controller perspective,” in 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Guidance, Navigation 
and Control Conference, 2004. 
[52]  L. Boursier, E. Hoffman, L. Rognin, F. Vergne, and K. Zeghal, “Airborne Spacing 
in the Terminal Area: A study of non-nominal situations,” in Sixth AIAA Aviation 
Technology, Integration and Operations Conference, 2006. 
[53]  L. Boursier, B. Favennec, E. Hoffman, L. Rognin, F. Vergne, and K. Zeghal, 
“Combining sequencing tool and spacing instructions to enhance the management of 
arrival flows of aircraft,” in American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 5th 
Aviation, Technology, Integration, and Operations Conference (ATIO), Arlington, 
Virginia, 2005. 
[54]  W. J. Penhallegon and R. S. Bone, “Evaluation of a flight deck-based merging and 
spacing concept on en-route air traffic control operations,” in Barcelona, Spain: 7th 
USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D Seminar, 2007. 
[55]  W. J. Penhallegon and R. S. Bone, “Flight deck-based merging and spacing impact 
on flight crew operations during continuous descent arrivals and approaches,” in 
Digital Avionics Systems Conference, 2008. DASC 2008. IEEE/AIAA 27th, 2008, 
p. 3. 
[56]  W. J. Penhallegon and R. S. Bone, “Flight Deck-Based Merging and Spacing 
during En Route Descent: Findings from an Air Traffic Controller Simulation.” 
[57]  D. H. Williams, “Time-based self-spacing techniques using cockpit display of 
traffic information during approach to landing in a terminal area vectoring 
environment,” NASA-TM-84601, 1983. 
[58]  S. Oconnor, E. Palmer, D. Baty, and S. Jago, “The effect of viewing time, time to 
encounter, and practice on perception of aircraft separation on a cockpit display of 
traffic information,” A-8072; NASA-TM-81173, Feb. 1980. 
[59]  T. S. Abbott and G. C. Moen, “Effect of Display Size on Utilization of Traffic 
Situation Display for Self-Spacing Task,” NASA-TP-1885, 1981. 
[60]  R. M. Oseguera-Lohr, G. W. Lohr, T. S. Abbott, and T. M. Eischeid, “Evaluation 
of operational procedures for using a time-based airborne interarrival spacing tool,” 
in Digital Avionics Systems Conference. 
 141 
[61]  B. E. Barmore, T. S. Abbott, and W. R. Capron, “Evaluation of Airborne Precision 
Spacing in a Human-in-the-Loop Experiment,” in AIAA 5 th Aviation, Technology, 
Integration, and Operations Conference(ATIO), 2005, pp. 1–13. 
[62]  J. Murdoch, B. Barmore, B. Baxley, W. Capron, and T. Abbott, “Evaluation of an 
Airborne Spacing Concept to Support Continuous Descent Arrival Operations,” in 
8th USA-Europe Research and Development Seminar - ATM 2009, 29 Jun. - 2 Jul. 
2009, Napa, CA, United States, 2009. 
[63]  K. Swieringa, J. Murdoch, B. Baxley, and C. Hubbs, “Evaluation of an Airborne 
Spacing Concept, On-board Spacing Tool, and Pilot Interface,” in 11th AIAA 
Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations (ATIO) Conference, including 
the AIA 20 - 22 September 2011, Virginia Beach, VA, 2011. 
[64]  P. Volk, M. A. Takallu, K. Hoffler, and D. Turner, “Preliminary Navigation 
Requirements Analysis of Simplified Aircraft-Based Parallel Approach Concept,” 
Adaptive Aerospace Group, INC, Nov. 2010. 
[65]  A. R. Pritchett and L. J. Yankosky, “Pilot performance at new ATM operations- 
Maintaining in-trail separation and arrival sequencing,” in AIAA Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control Conference and Exhibit, Denver, CO, 2000. 
[66]  H. N. Swenson et al., “Design and Operational Evaluation of the Traffic 
Management Advisor at the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control Center,” in 1st 
USA/Europe Air Traffic Management R&D Seminar, 1997. 
[67]  K. K. Lee, C. M. Quinn, T. Hoang, and B. D. Sanford, “Human factors report: 
TMA operational evaluations 1996 & 1998,” Moffett Field, CA, NASA Ames 
Research Center, 2000. 
[68]  H. Swenson, A. Sadovsky, A. Y. Seo, and C. Los Altos, “Effects Of Scheduling 
And Spacing Tools On Controllers’ Performance And Perceptions Of Their 
Workload.” 
[69]  H. N. Swenson, J. Thipphavong, A. Sadovsky, L. Chen, C. Sullivan, and L. Martin, 
“Design and Evaluation of the Terminal Area Precision Scheduling and Spacing 
System,” in Ninth USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research & Development 
Seminar, Berlin, Germany. 
[70]  J. Thipphavong, H. Swenson, P. Lin, A. Y. Seo, and L. N. Bagasol, “Efficiency 
Benefits Using the Terminal Area Precision Scheduling and Spacing System.” 
[71]  M. Kupfer, T. Callantine, L. Martin, J. Mercer, and E. Palmer, “Controller Support 
Tools for Schedule-Based Terminal-Area Operations,” in Ninth USA/Europe Air 
Traffic Management Research and Development Seminar (ATM2011), 2011. 
[72]  B. Baxley, C. Hubbs, R. Shay, and J. Karanian, “Use of Data Comm by Flight 
Crew to Conduct Interval Management Operations to Parallel Dependent Runways,” 
 142 
in AIAA-2011-6972. 11th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations 
(ATIO) Conference, including the AIAA Balloon Systems Conference and 19th 
AIAA Lighter-Than, Virginia Beach, VA, Sep. 20-22, 2011. 
[73]  M. Palmer and M. Ballin, “A High-Performance Simulated On-Board Avionics 
Architecture To Support Traffic Operations Research,” AIAA Modeling and 
Simulation Technologies Conference and Exhibit, Austin, Texas, AIAA 2003-5452, 
Aug. 2003. 
[74]  T. Abbott, “A Revised Trajectory Algorithm to Support En Route and Terminal 
Area Self-Spacing Concepts,” NASA/CR-2010-216204, Feb. 2010. 
[75]  T. S. Abbott, “Speed control law for precision terminal area in-trail self spacing,” 
NASA Technical Memorandum, vol. 211742, 2002. 
[76]  T. Abbott, “An Overview of a Trajectory-Based Solution for En Route and 
Terminal Area Self-Spacing to Include Parallel Runway Operations,” NASA/CR–
2011-217194, Nov. 2011. 
[77] “Global Operational Data Link Document (GOLD),” in Global Operational Data 
Link Document (GOLD), 2010. 
[78]  R. Verhoeven and N. Gelder, “Time-based navigation and ASAS interval managed 
CDA procedures,” 2009. 
 
 
